5 ms·

AWS Launches CloudHSM, Hardware Security Module For Managing Cryptographic Keys

45 points by ippisl 13y ago

howeyc 13y ago
Disclaimer: I've never been a fan of storing my data on someone else's hard drives, but many others seem to think it's a good idea. At any rate, how is this more secure? Amazon has physical access to S3 servers, and physical access to these new HSM things. So what exactly is the benefit? Is this just so companies can meet some security compliance regulations while keeping all their data Amazon's hard drives?
- jeremyjh 13y ago
  The entire point of HSM is that physical access does not compromise your keys. The keys are not stored on a disk, and if someone tries to pry it open, it will erase its memory. Check out their FAQ: http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/ http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/
  - MichaelGG 13y ago
    Extremely interesting paper on reverse engineering the Luna CA3, which is the same vendor Amazon is using: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf Edit: And the final report: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf Which says it took 7 months to do the reversing.
- cameronh90 13y ago
  Their primary feature is tamper-resistant key management. It means you can store your keys in a data centre - where people you don't fully trust may have physical hardware access - yet still have an expectation of security. Something like this is useful whether you use Amazon or a traditional data center.
- petcat 13y ago
  Yeah it's just compliance. But Amazon having physical access doesn't matter because this level of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is enforced by Amazon also, by contract.
  - count 13y ago
    It's also been tested for technical enforcement - the Luna SA stuff is FIPS certified.
  - marshray 13y ago
    Contracts are only a substitute for physical or cryptographic security when you're not the one with the most to lose from a successful compromise.
  - edwintorok 13y ago
    How can you know that your instance is talking to the real CloudHSM and not a software emulation that can reveal the keys? At some point Amazon might be forced (by some wiretapping lawys, or subpoena) to fake the HSM presented to your instances and give others access to your keys. Of course the attack window is considerably reduced, if they want to perform this attack they have to do it when you initially set up the CloudHSM, they can't replace it later with a fake HSM, but still...
    - rdl 13y ago
      Generally HSMs have manufacturer keys, too, so you'd need to compromise both Amazon and SafeNet (admittedly, both US companies which could be subject to court order...). The weak point is initial provisioning, as you point out.
      - rdl 13y ago
        Fuck, sadly I just talked to safenet at their booth at aws and they don't do this, so you are totally vulnerable to giving keys to a fake hsm, essentially making cloud hsm useless. Unless their booth dudes were misinformed.
SoftwareMaven 13y ago
That is really expensive. You can start provisioning your own HSM for well under $5000 (of course, you can spend as much as you want :). I'm guessing Amazon is counting on people who have large AWS deployments and want a closer HSM. You are paying a lot to reduce latency.
- jcase 13y ago
  The Luna SA they are using doesn't come cheap. For an H/A setup with all the extras (backup tools, service contract) I was quoted ~$80k.
  - SoftwareMaven 13y ago
    But the majority of people don't need that much HSM. And that's the interesting problem I see with this: the enterprise can afford it, but is going to be wary of using a cloud provider for this sensitive of data; and it's outside the budget of most startups. There is probably a tier in the middle, though, that Amazon expects will happily use the product.
    - count 13y ago
      If you're using an HSM for full DAR of your servers, you need all the H/A you can get. IF that HSM is down, you can't boot your systems, period. If that HSM crashes or is destroyed, you potentially lose everything.
- count 13y ago
  You're paying for way more than latency reduction. You're also eliminating the overhead of buying, provisioning, supporting, etc. the whole system (which is definitely not pain free). The latency reduction is a nice added benefit, but it's definitely not the main one. Where are you even going to put your $5k HSM? In your $50k colo cage? Under your desk and route out via your home cable modem?
  - kordless 13y ago
ceejayoz 13y ago
This is about a month old, now.
- ippisl 13y ago
  It's relevant to the discussion regarding living social's recent hack.
fixxer 13y ago
Should be entertaining when this gets hacked.
- ghshephard 13y ago
  The entire idea behind HSMs is to reduce the potential for them being hacked. These are FIPS 140-2 Tamper Proof devices. You rarely hear about these being hacked, if ever.
mike-cardwell 13y ago
How do these devices differ from a £50 Cryptostick https://www.crypto-stick.com/ https://www.crypto-stick.com/ or a £10 OpenPGP SmartCard? http://g10code.com/p-card.html http://g10code.com/p-card.html
- rdl 13y ago
  Security, performance, and functionality/features. They're generally FIPS 140-2 level 3 (and a couple are 4), so protected against physical and logical attacks. Generally they have modexp accelerators and have performance equivalent to a main CPU (they used to be way faster than CPUs...). Mainly, they have tools for multi-party key management, crypto fill, reset, etc. Some of which can work remotely/over the network, which is the main weakness of the low end smartcard in this environment.

45 points by ippisl 13y ago

Disclaimer: I've never been a fan of storing my data on someone else's hard drives, but many others seem to think it's a good idea. At any rate, how is this more secure? Amazon has physical access to S3 servers, and physical access to these new HSM things. So what exactly is the benefit? Is this just so companies can meet some security compliance regulations while keeping all their data Amazon's hard drives?

jeremyjh 13y ago
The entire point of HSM is that physical access does not compromise your keys. The keys are not stored on a disk, and if someone tries to pry it open, it will erase its memory. Check out their FAQ: http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/ http://aws.amazon.com/cloudhsm/faqs/
- MichaelGG 13y ago
  Extremely interesting paper on reverse engineering the Luna CA3, which is the same vendor Amazon is using: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/Chrysalis.pdf Edit: And the final report: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-592.pdf Which says it took 7 months to do the reversing.
cameronh90 13y ago
Their primary feature is tamper-resistant key management. It means you can store your keys in a data centre - where people you don't fully trust may have physical hardware access - yet still have an expectation of security. Something like this is useful whether you use Amazon or a traditional data center.
petcat 13y ago
Yeah it's just compliance. But Amazon having physical access doesn't matter because this level of CIA (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is enforced by Amazon also, by contract.
- count 13y ago
  It's also been tested for technical enforcement - the Luna SA stuff is FIPS certified.
- marshray 13y ago
  Contracts are only a substitute for physical or cryptographic security when you're not the one with the most to lose from a successful compromise.
- edwintorok 13y ago
  How can you know that your instance is talking to the real CloudHSM and not a software emulation that can reveal the keys? At some point Amazon might be forced (by some wiretapping lawys, or subpoena) to fake the HSM presented to your instances and give others access to your keys. Of course the attack window is considerably reduced, if they want to perform this attack they have to do it when you initially set up the CloudHSM, they can't replace it later with a fake HSM, but still...
  - rdl 13y ago
    Generally HSMs have manufacturer keys, too, so you'd need to compromise both Amazon and SafeNet (admittedly, both US companies which could be subject to court order...). The weak point is initial provisioning, as you point out.
    - rdl 13y ago
      Fuck, sadly I just talked to safenet at their booth at aws and they don't do this, so you are totally vulnerable to giving keys to a fake hsm, essentially making cloud hsm useless. Unless their booth dudes were misinformed.

SoftwareMaven 13y ago

That is really expensive. You can start provisioning your own HSM for well under $5000 (of course, you can spend as much as you want :). I'm guessing Amazon is counting on people who have large AWS deployments and want a closer HSM. You are paying a lot to reduce latency.

jcase 13y ago
The Luna SA they are using doesn't come cheap. For an H/A setup with all the extras (backup tools, service contract) I was quoted ~$80k.
- SoftwareMaven 13y ago
  But the majority of people don't need that much HSM. And that's the interesting problem I see with this: the enterprise can afford it, but is going to be wary of using a cloud provider for this sensitive of data; and it's outside the budget of most startups. There is probably a tier in the middle, though, that Amazon expects will happily use the product.
  - count 13y ago
    If you're using an HSM for full DAR of your servers, you need all the H/A you can get. IF that HSM is down, you can't boot your systems, period. If that HSM crashes or is destroyed, you potentially lose everything.
count 13y ago
You're paying for way more than latency reduction. You're also eliminating the overhead of buying, provisioning, supporting, etc. the whole system (which is definitely not pain free). The latency reduction is a nice added benefit, but it's definitely not the main one. Where are you even going to put your $5k HSM? In your $50k colo cage? Under your desk and route out via your home cable modem?
- kordless 13y ago

ceejayoz 13y ago

This is about a month old, now.

ippisl 13y ago
It's relevant to the discussion regarding living social's recent hack.

fixxer 13y ago

Should be entertaining when this gets hacked.

ghshephard 13y ago
The entire idea behind HSMs is to reduce the potential for them being hacked. These are FIPS 140-2 Tamper Proof devices. You rarely hear about these being hacked, if ever.

mike-cardwell 13y ago

How do these devices differ from a £50 Cryptostick https://www.crypto-stick.com/ https://www.crypto-stick.com/ or a £10 OpenPGP SmartCard? http://g10code.com/p-card.html http://g10code.com/p-card.html

rdl 13y ago
Security, performance, and functionality/features. They're generally FIPS 140-2 level 3 (and a couple are 4), so protected against physical and logical attacks. Generally they have modexp accelerators and have performance equivalent to a main CPU (they used to be way faster than CPUs...). Mainly, they have tools for multi-party key management, crypto fill, reset, etc. Some of which can work remotely/over the network, which is the main weakness of the low end smartcard in this environment.