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"What I would like to discuss is what purpose would simulating a universe have for the advanced civilisation?" The Douglas Adams-style answer would be that we'

"What I would like to discuss is what purpose would simulating a universe have for the advanced civilisation?" The Douglas Adams-style answer would be that we're some kid's physics homework. Perhaps, in a sufficiently advanced civilization, building a working computer model of an advanced universe is child's play. An alternative is that the simulators inhabit a very different universe from our own, and that our simulation is something entirely new. It's not a replica of their universe; it's a completely different creation. They could be studying various scenarios, of which ours is just one. We need to bear in mind that we're approaching this problem from our own, subjective understanding of our universe. It's not a given that the simulators' universe is anything like ours.

polshaw 14y ago
If we are to say it is a perfect or near perfect simulation ('copy') then I don't see how, as stated in my first post. It's interesting to consider if we were a different simulation. But it would still have the same limits (that the sum of the activity ('reality') in each simulation must be less large/complex than it's host), prohibiting the 'infinite simulations' concept. It surely isn't necessary that we are similar to a host universe, but I wouldn't you say it was a necessary part of this theory?; because it all starts with the vastness of our own space(-time) as the justification for the likelihood of super-advanced civilisations. You could argue that the size of our universe implies simulations must happen, and that if our universe were a simulation the host must be larger, i suppose. If the simulations are not similar to their host, though, the foundation suggestion that a simulation could be our universe seems a little more shaky (as there would be no direct theory ('evidence') that a universe like ours could be simulated). There is perhaps a semantic issue too.. if somewhere in this universe we are simulating something that works on different rules to our universe, is it in fact a universe, or what makes it so?
- jonnathanson 14y ago
  "It surely isn't necessary that we are similar to a host universe, but I wouldn't you say it was a necessary part of this theory?" I don't think it's a necessary part of the theory, but it's a necessary part of the test we would need to conduct. And given that such a test is simply testing for inconsistencies, artifacts and bugs inherent to our own universe/simulation, it's possible to detect whether we're in a simulation without having to test for the precise nature of it (or the nature of the simulators). But our tests are inherently being conducted from our own frame of reference, with our own understanding of what should and shouldn't be found. Ergo, we can prove a simulation by finding artifacts of one as recognizable to us, but we can't necessarily disprove a simulation by not finding artifacts. That being said, the proper way to think about the test wouldn't be "Physicists are testing to determine if we're in a simulation." It would be "Physicists are testing to find evidence that we're in a simulation."

polshaw 14y ago

If we are to say it is a perfect or near perfect simulation ('copy') then I don't see how, as stated in my first post. It's interesting to consider if we were a different simulation. But it would still have the same limits (that the sum of the activity ('reality') in each simulation must be less large/complex than it's host), prohibiting the 'infinite simulations' concept. It surely isn't necessary that we are similar to a host universe, but I wouldn't you say it was a necessary part of this theory?; because it all starts with the vastness of our own space(-time) as the justification for the likelihood of super-advanced civilisations. You could argue that the size of our universe implies simulations must happen, and that if our universe were a simulation the host must be larger, i suppose. If the simulations are not similar to their host, though, the foundation suggestion that a simulation could be our universe seems a little more shaky (as there would be no direct theory ('evidence') that a universe like ours could be simulated). There is perhaps a semantic issue too.. if somewhere in this universe we are simulating something that works on different rules to our universe, is it in fact a universe, or what makes it so?

jonnathanson 14y ago
"It surely isn't necessary that we are similar to a host universe, but I wouldn't you say it was a necessary part of this theory?" I don't think it's a necessary part of the theory, but it's a necessary part of the test we would need to conduct. And given that such a test is simply testing for inconsistencies, artifacts and bugs inherent to our own universe/simulation, it's possible to detect whether we're in a simulation without having to test for the precise nature of it (or the nature of the simulators). But our tests are inherently being conducted from our own frame of reference, with our own understanding of what should and shouldn't be found. Ergo, we can prove a simulation by finding artifacts of one as recognizable to us, but we can't necessarily disprove a simulation by not finding artifacts. That being said, the proper way to think about the test wouldn't be "Physicists are testing to determine if we're in a simulation." It would be "Physicists are testing to find evidence that we're in a simulation."