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The private key shouldn't be on any machine that it isn't used on. If we assume that the key is used on that machine, and is password protected, and is used au
by mike-cardwell 14y ago
The private key shouldn't be on any machine that it isn't used on.
If we assume that the key is used on that machine, and is password protected, and is used automatically, then the unencrypted key, or its password, must exist in memory, if not on disk. Perhaps they log in when the machine boots and manually enter the password once, so it is cached and can be used for repeat decryption processes.
If the key is in memory, then a blackhat who knows what he's doing can get access to it.
- corford 14y agoThis isn't a problem unique to Linode though. The same risk is present for every system that needs a password/passphrase to decrypt. This is why effective security (not absolute - which is impossible for any system that has to connect with other systems) can only be achieved through a layered approach. Linode layered pretty well: Hashed and salted passwords, isolated systems, encrypted CC database and passphrase protected decryption key with no written record of what that passphrase is. They didn't do a perfect job but then who does (or even can)?