4 ms·

Also (and correct me if my understanding of this is wrong since I've never used it), LISH is just a remote terminal service. You still need to know the VM's roo

by corford 14y ago

Also (and correct me if my understanding of this is wrong since I've never used it), LISH is just a remote terminal service. You still need to know the VM's root password. And frankly, if you're doing it right, the root password should be a long, unique random string that you store somewhere safe and never use since you should be using keys to login to your box on a day to day basis.

jtolj 14y ago
I'm pretty sure this is correct. The LISH passwords just give you console access via ssh (as an alternative to the web-based terminal in Linode Admin), which is essentially the equivalent of getting to an ssh prompt. A login/password would still be required to access the machine. It doesn't appear that you can reboot or enter single user mode from the LISH console login prompt.
joeyh 14y ago
It's quite likely that someone has left root logged in on hvc0 (the LISH console) on their Linode, while logging out of LISH. Probably more than one person. Also, access to LISH even without a root password provides access to some scrollback output, which could expose sensitive information. Also, LISH allows multiple connections, all of which see the same console, so the attacker can just connect to it and wait for a root prompt to appear when root logs in next. (Does changing the LISH password prevent this attack if they're already connected? I doubt it.) Also, most distribution boot processes can be messed with at boot from the console. For example, you can ctrl-c to stop important daemons from loading. In some cases you may be able to get a shell without the root password. Also, Magic SysRq can be accessed over a serial console by sending a BRK. You do not need to be logged in to do this, and it could be used to kill processes, reboot, etc. I don't know if LISH allows sending BRK.
- jtolj 14y ago
  Shoot, you are correct. Definitely an attack vector. The connection is to the same TTY when I log in via the web terminal and SSH at the same time, so if you are logged in via LISH anyone with the LISH password has access to the logged in user's console + scrollback. I wasn't able to send BRK from Putty though.
- corford 14y ago
  Yeah but most of these are generic problems with providing a remote serial console (excluding LISH allowing multiple shared connections to one console, which is obviously bad). They've now reset all the passwords and fixed the bug that meant some of them were being stored without encryption. So what we're saying is there was window of a week or so where only LISH users affected by the clear text bug may have been open to an attack if they happened to use LISH during this time frame and the attacker was targeting them. Not great, I agree, but could have been worse. Hopefully, they'll change their setup going forward so that each LISH connection to the same VM gets its own console.

by corford 14y ago

jtolj 14y ago

I'm pretty sure this is correct. The LISH passwords just give you console access via ssh (as an alternative to the web-based terminal in Linode Admin), which is essentially the equivalent of getting to an ssh prompt. A login/password would still be required to access the machine. It doesn't appear that you can reboot or enter single user mode from the LISH console login prompt.

joeyh 14y ago

It's quite likely that someone has left root logged in on hvc0 (the LISH console) on their Linode, while logging out of LISH. Probably more than one person. Also, access to LISH even without a root password provides access to some scrollback output, which could expose sensitive information. Also, LISH allows multiple connections, all of which see the same console, so the attacker can just connect to it and wait for a root prompt to appear when root logs in next. (Does changing the LISH password prevent this attack if they're already connected? I doubt it.) Also, most distribution boot processes can be messed with at boot from the console. For example, you can ctrl-c to stop important daemons from loading. In some cases you may be able to get a shell without the root password. Also, Magic SysRq can be accessed over a serial console by sending a BRK. You do not need to be logged in to do this, and it could be used to kill processes, reboot, etc. I don't know if LISH allows sending BRK.

jtolj 14y ago
Shoot, you are correct. Definitely an attack vector. The connection is to the same TTY when I log in via the web terminal and SSH at the same time, so if you are logged in via LISH anyone with the LISH password has access to the logged in user's console + scrollback. I wasn't able to send BRK from Putty though.
corford 14y ago
Yeah but most of these are generic problems with providing a remote serial console (excluding LISH allowing multiple shared connections to one console, which is obviously bad). They've now reset all the passwords and fixed the bug that meant some of them were being stored without encryption. So what we're saying is there was window of a week or so where only LISH users affected by the clear text bug may have been open to an attack if they happened to use LISH during this time frame and the attacker was targeting them. Not great, I agree, but could have been worse. Hopefully, they'll change their setup going forward so that each LISH connection to the same VM gets its own console.