4 ms·

It would be nice to get an actual technical rebuttal describing why his stuff doesn't work rather than the sleight-of-hand English and PR responses in that arti

It would be nice to get an actual technical rebuttal describing why his stuff doesn't work rather than the sleight-of-hand English and PR responses in that article (The whole "industry standard robustness yada" bit makes my cringe). Based on their responses it sounds like "Yes, these systems are vulnerable but a good pilot will ignore the bad data so the plane is not vulnerable." which does not exactly give me the warm fuzzies. (Good point here at the bottom: http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/04/hacking-commercial-aircraft-with-an-android-app-some-conditions-apply/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/04/hacking-commercial-a... ) All his hack needs to be able to do is cause problems for the pilot (bad information etc.) for this to be a problem. I mean, if there is no issue then surely he is now justified in publishing his work and them publishing in detail why it is not a risk.

fnordfnordfnord 14y ago
>"Yes, these systems are vulnerable but a good pilot will ignore the bad data so the plane is not vulnerable." Right, like on Air France Flight 447. Obligatory Dilbert: http://search.dilbert.com/search?w=Flight++laptop&view=list&filter=type%3Acomic http://search.dilbert.com/search?w=Flight++laptop&view=l...
- antmldr 14y ago
  I think what you're describing is more a culture problem than an issue with the design of the FMS or pilots receiving incorrect information from instruments. Any pilot will tell you the very last thing you want is to be at war with your own aircraft (or its instruments), but incorrect readings should not solely cause an incident. This is also the case with AF447. I'm more likely after reading the CVR to put the incident down to poor communication between the crew (in the industry known as CRM or Crew / Cockpit Resource Management) [1]. The crew failed to effectively communicate what each other were doing, to the extent where they were inputting opposite commands to the flight controls and had a misunderstanding of what conditions triggered certain flight control modes [2] of the Airbus' autopilot. Coming back to the original point around culture and training, it was evident that the more junior pilots were relying on certain "protections" the autopilot has against conditions like a stall. It's this reliance upon a computer (commanding a full nose-up during a stall) and lack of understanding of how the aircraft's flight computer acts under certain conditions that ultimately ended 228 people's lives. The French investigation concluded that the inconsistency of speed measurements was only one of seven factors that caused the accident. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes_%28electronic%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes_%28electro... EDIT: Having said that, I would not want to be the pilot flying an aircraft where I can't trust my own instruments, however there are numerous cases (QF72 [3] comes to mind) where pilots have had to disregard most if not all digital instrument readings and stick to the bare minimum to safely land. [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72
lsh123 14y ago
Brief technical explanation. The "attack" consists of the following steps: 1) Modify the desktop simulator FMS code to support commands in the data protocols (e.g. ADS-B). 2) Send commands through data link to utilize the newly created control channel. What FAA is saying that 1) It is hard if not impossible to actually inject un-authorized code into an embedded airplane system (FMS, GPS, ...) due to strict quality controls in place. 2) Even if one succeeds with 1) then you still have limits of what FMS can actually do with the plane because it is a separate unit from other systems with well defined protocols (e.g. FMS doesn't control the lights in the plane). IMHO, the whole "hack" sounds like a BS/PR action. Yes, you can "fake" GPS, ADS-B, and other communication protocols. However, there are other sources of information for pilots (e.g. the old and true magnetic compass) that can and should be used to validate and cross-reference the data. From a pilot's perspective, a "fake" GPS is no different from a "failed" GPS (yes, this happens). One should be ready to deal with this to qualify as a pilot.
- antmldr 14y ago
  Yep, hit the nail on the head. Thing is, if you're able to inject un-authorised code into the FMS, chances are you have bigger concerns than a single aircraft getting hijacked. It's the equivalent of saying "If I had access to a bank's mainframe and network infrastructure, I could steal millions of dollars with an Android App." Sure you could, but is the problem the fact you can do it with an Android App, or the fact you were able to inject the code in the first place?
  - malkarouri 14y ago
    Exactly. If I have that much capabilities I would buy the airline. It seems neater.
- ubernostrum 14y ago
  Even briefer explanation. The attack consists of: 1. Get root on one of the plane's systems somehow. 2. After completing step (1), use this Android app to abuse this to display some messages which the pilot will identify as bogus.
- 14y ago

fnordfnordfnord 14y ago

>"Yes, these systems are vulnerable but a good pilot will ignore the bad data so the plane is not vulnerable." Right, like on Air France Flight 447. Obligatory Dilbert: http://search.dilbert.com/search?w=Flight++laptop&view=list&filter=type%3Acomic http://search.dilbert.com/search?w=Flight++laptop&view=l...

antmldr 14y ago
I think what you're describing is more a culture problem than an issue with the design of the FMS or pilots receiving incorrect information from instruments. Any pilot will tell you the very last thing you want is to be at war with your own aircraft (or its instruments), but incorrect readings should not solely cause an incident. This is also the case with AF447. I'm more likely after reading the CVR to put the incident down to poor communication between the crew (in the industry known as CRM or Crew / Cockpit Resource Management) [1]. The crew failed to effectively communicate what each other were doing, to the extent where they were inputting opposite commands to the flight controls and had a misunderstanding of what conditions triggered certain flight control modes [2] of the Airbus' autopilot. Coming back to the original point around culture and training, it was evident that the more junior pilots were relying on certain "protections" the autopilot has against conditions like a stall. It's this reliance upon a computer (commanding a full nose-up during a stall) and lack of understanding of how the aircraft's flight computer acts under certain conditions that ultimately ended 228 people's lives. The French investigation concluded that the inconsistency of speed measurements was only one of seven factors that caused the accident. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crew_Resource_Management [2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes_%28electronic%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flight_control_modes_%28electro... EDIT: Having said that, I would not want to be the pilot flying an aircraft where I can't trust my own instruments, however there are numerous cases (QF72 [3] comes to mind) where pilots have had to disregard most if not all digital instrument readings and stick to the bare minimum to safely land. [3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_72

lsh123 14y ago

Brief technical explanation. The "attack" consists of the following steps: 1) Modify the desktop simulator FMS code to support commands in the data protocols (e.g. ADS-B). 2) Send commands through data link to utilize the newly created control channel. What FAA is saying that 1) It is hard if not impossible to actually inject un-authorized code into an embedded airplane system (FMS, GPS, ...) due to strict quality controls in place. 2) Even if one succeeds with 1) then you still have limits of what FMS can actually do with the plane because it is a separate unit from other systems with well defined protocols (e.g. FMS doesn't control the lights in the plane). IMHO, the whole "hack" sounds like a BS/PR action. Yes, you can "fake" GPS, ADS-B, and other communication protocols. However, there are other sources of information for pilots (e.g. the old and true magnetic compass) that can and should be used to validate and cross-reference the data. From a pilot's perspective, a "fake" GPS is no different from a "failed" GPS (yes, this happens). One should be ready to deal with this to qualify as a pilot.

antmldr 14y ago
Yep, hit the nail on the head. Thing is, if you're able to inject un-authorised code into the FMS, chances are you have bigger concerns than a single aircraft getting hijacked. It's the equivalent of saying "If I had access to a bank's mainframe and network infrastructure, I could steal millions of dollars with an Android App." Sure you could, but is the problem the fact you can do it with an Android App, or the fact you were able to inject the code in the first place?
- malkarouri 14y ago
  Exactly. If I have that much capabilities I would buy the airline. It seems neater.
ubernostrum 14y ago
Even briefer explanation. The attack consists of: 1. Get root on one of the plane's systems somehow. 2. After completing step (1), use this Android app to abuse this to display some messages which the pilot will identify as bogus.
14y ago