3 ms·
There seems to be two threads here bashing heads against each other 1. The specific details of this (admittedly movie-plot-threat) are wonky and not believed b
by lifeisstillgood 14y ago
There seems to be two threads here bashing heads against each other
1. The specific details of this (admittedly movie-plot-threat) are wonky and not believed by reasonable people in the industry
2. The digital security of most systems when looked at by Internet-hardened veterans is somewhere between vulnerable and laughable, so why should planes be different (ie gas and water control pumps with ethernet ports and factory set default passwords like admin)
2. seems to be most peoples default response - "hey look, another thing thats been connected to the internet, its probably wide open"
That is a good response to have as a) anecdotally it seems to be right 9 times out of 10, and b) its the right side of caution anyway.
The fact that 1. is much harder to do than perhaps shown is indicative that things in the FAA arent as bad as say, sewage treatment industry.
But, even so, all our systems are now connected and so much more vulnerable. And even if this guy cannot down planes with his android phone, he has gotten a hell of a lot closer than anyone not totally paranoid would assume.
I think the correct response would be
This specific setup does not apparently live up to the
media hype. However, all digital security is undergoing a
period of massively increased attack, and we should never
be complacent. He has gotten further than we expected
feasible and will be looking at a program of fixing attack
vectors run under the same rules as air-crash
investigation. Any known bug is investigated, understood
and a comprehensive solution made transparently available
to the industry.
The airline industry is rightly proud of its safety record, and it should see this as an opportunity to become rightly proud of its digital security record too.
- gcr 14y agoThere's a third angle: Exploits. UCSD and UW researchers have demonstrated the ability for an attacker to take full control of many modern cars just by dialing the car's 3G modem. By "full control", I mean everything from "unlock the doors and start the engine" to "engage/disable the brakes and stop the engine" Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input — including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on. We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car’s two internal subnets. http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf Edit: No, they really did demonstrate these vulnerabilities on real cars, it's not a theoretical analysis. Here's a link to their full research talk: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHfOziIwXic http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHfOziIwXic
- Finster 14y agoUnfortunately, the article you cite is similar to OP's article. In this paper we intentionally and explicitly skirt the question of a “threat model.” Instead, we focus primarily on what an attacker could do to a car if she was able to maliciously communicate on the car’s internal network. That said, this does beg the question of how she might be able to gain such access. While we leave a full analysis of the modern automobile’s attack surface to future research, we briefly describe here the two “kinds” of vectors by which one might gain access to a car’s internal networks. So, no, they didn't ACTUALLY dial a car's 3G modem. That is merely a theorized attack vector. There is no proof of concept here.
- tptacek 14y agoThe comparison here oversimplifies. Avionics engineers are on this thread saying there's no physical/logical connectivity between RF and flight control systems. But that's not true of cars; we know cars do have at least some RF controls, and we're far less certain of the connectivity between CAN devices in a car than the avionics people are of the connectivity between ACARS and flight control.
- gcr 14y agoNo, they really did demonstrate these vulnerabilities on real cars, it's not a theoretical analysis. Here's a link to their full research talk: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHfOziIwXic http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHfOziIwXic I've been to both the UW and UCSD security labs and have seen their videos. It's real. This is ongoing work and honestly I cited the first article I could find.
- dguido 14y agoHere is a video of a similar attack being performed on a real car by another researcher who discovered the same vulnerabilities/attack vector in parallel to the academic team (1m30s): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNDv00SGb6w https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNDv00SGb6w NOT theoretical.
- Serow225 14y agoDisclaimer alert - the following is pure speculation, but I have a tiny bit of experience with avionics from a past job. 1) background reading: http://members.optusnet.com.au/~cjr/CPDLC.htm http://members.optusnet.com.au/~cjr/CPDLC.htm http://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/edocs/GOLD_1st_Edition.pdf http://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/edocs/GOLD_1st_Edition.pd... RTCA DO-219, if anyone can find it. 2) The slides don't provide enough details, I haven't had time to listen to the talk to see if it fills in more info - the critical part is how/if he's managed to convince the FMS to accept ACARS uplinks other than the 'harmless' three defined uplink messages that are automatically accepted by the FMS without pilot acknowledgement. My guess is that by having access to a FMS code/simulator, he figured out a buffer overflow or other hack that lets him inject FMS command messages without pilot acknowledgment, which is normally required of all other uplink messages. 3) In my admittedly tiny amount of experience, the designers of avionics communications protocols aren't dumb. They tend to be very old-school looking formats (low level, fixed fields, etc) because they were often designed when avionics equipment had little processing power, but at the same time this means that the format spec has a small surface area. Also sometimes it's possible that there's not 'security' as we think of it in terms of encrypted links, but there is often a lot of thought put into the messaging sequence (send/ack/etc), including pilot confirmation, to ensure that garbage isn't accepted.