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This article and the DEA doc is confusing. It seems to mainly be saying that having a warrant to intercept cell communications won't get iMessages because it d

by smackfu 14y ago

This article and the DEA doc is confusing. It seems to mainly be saying that having a warrant to intercept cell communications won't get iMessages because it doesn't go through the cell carrier. It's implied a bit that it is encrypted end-to-end and that Apple can't get the contents... but it doesn't seem to actually say that anywhere. This comment on StackExchange says the encryption is only from sender to Apple and Apple to recipient, so Apple has the plaintext: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18908/the-inner-workings-of-imessage-security http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18908/the-inner-... Also, wouldn't the same issues have come up with BBM?

declan 14y ago
It's not implied; the article states outright the encryption is end-to-end. :) That's based on Apple press releases from 2011 and 2012. See, for example: http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/06/06New-Version-of-iOS-Includes-Notification-Center-iMessage-Newsstand-Twitter-Integration-Among-200-New-Features.html http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/06/06New-Version-of-iOS... "secure end-to-end encryption"
- IheartApplesDix 14y ago
  Secure end to end encryption doesn't mean government agencies can't snoop on the coms. First of all, the CIA owns own one of the largest, if not the largest supercomputer. Also, the encryption could be using CIA's own root key. Example: http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/hacks/lotus-nsa-key.html http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/hacks/lotus-nsa-key.html