> The only time disk encryption is valuable is when the machine is off or the disks are being transported. I'm thinking about the case where you have a compute

> The only time disk encryption is valuable is when the machine is off or the disks are being transported. I'm thinking about the case where you have a computer in the home or office environment, e.g. the burglary attack vector. It's not just notebooks that get stolen. I'm also considering the corporate or government espionage vector, where you have a reasonably skilled on-site attacker trying to read or modify the disk contents. In this case you are typing the keys in on boot, and you either ignore the RAM extraction attacks (which are difficult to execute in practice for non-academic attackers) or you can mitigate them by storing in L1 cache and so on. Datacenters have unusually high physical security, and in addition I don't generally store highly sensitive data there (my work doesn't involve PCI compliance etc.) Whereas I do have PCI-level data about myself on my own computers.