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This is an incomplete definition of privacy. If the service and server collude, you are hosed. There are cryptographic constructions(anonymous credentials) that
by anologwintermut 14y ago
This is an incomplete definition of privacy. If the service and server collude, you are hosed. There are cryptographic constructions(anonymous credentials) that have been around for over a decade that prevent this. IBM and Microsoft both have (unfortunately incompatible) libraries that do this. If we really are trying to build the id scheme of the future, why not use these?
- lifeisstillgood 14y agoCan you provide links?
- anologwintermut 14y agoSure, though unfortunately I know of none that provide a decent balance between high level explanations and cryptographic depth. The main actual deployed usage of the technique is in TPM's for direct anonymous attestation. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Anonymous_Attestation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Anonymous_Attestation IBM explains their project here http://www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix/details.html http://www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix/details.html The original academic work its based on is this http://cs.brown.edu/~anna/papers/cl01a.pdf http://cs.brown.edu/~anna/papers/cl01a.pdf A different(and older) technique which, by my understanding, is mainly useful for smart cards, is deployed in a prototype system from microsoft : http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/u-prove/ http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/u-prove/