4 ms·

The supreme court does not "side with" any particular party (ideally); they "side with" a specific interpretation of the law. If you read both the court's opin

The supreme court does not "side with" any particular party (ideally); they "side with" a specific interpretation of the law. If you read both the court's opinion and the dissenting opinion, you'll see that the dissenting opinion is strictly based on interpretation. The supreme court not only attempts to interpret how to apply the law, but determine what congress' intent was when enacting the law.

DannyBee 14y ago
Actually, at least 2 justices specifically do not determine congress's intent, because they do not believe it matters. If you look, you'll see they often specifically refuse to join in footnotes/etc that cite congressional intent or history.
- SEMW 14y ago
  It's possible they're still trying to determine congress's intent in a sense, they just give a more objective meaning to 'intent': i.e. what a reasonable person reading the statute would think that congress meant by the words they used. (As opposed to what they actually, subjectively meant, per extrinsic evidence like statements made in congress). That's the way intent is read in contract law: it's judged objectively (from the position of a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time of contracting), subjective intentions don't matter. [Edit: while true of English contract law, this is apparently not accurate for US contract law: see DannyBee's reply] (I'm only guessing - I'm an English law student, so not familiar with US supreme court justices, so could be completely wrong on what they're doing. [Edit: yup, I was.])
  - DannyBee 14y ago
    Speaking as a lawyer familiar with both english and US law: English contract law is a bit different than US. In the US, it's not objective in general (contracts are held against the drafter, and subjective intent matters). Your description of objective intent is well, not intent in this case :) Objective intent of congress would be what a reasonable person making the statute would have meant, not what a reasonable person reading the statute would think it meant. The second is in fact, what is done, but is not related to intent at all, it's related to interpretation. As for congress's intent, Scalia is of the firm view that either objective intent, or subjective intent does not matter. The words mean what they say, and say what they mean, and if they don't, that's a problem for the legislature. In cases of ambiguity, he believes in plain meaning, not objective intent. So he'll use a dictionary, not try to figure out what congress objectively meant. He's fairly unwavering in the above, though if you look through hundreds of opinions, you can generally find one or two that are not consistent with this. http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/salvatori/publications/RARScalia.asp http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/salvatori/publications/RARSc... and http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3109&context=dlj http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=... are fairly good descriptions of his approach
    - SEMW 14y ago
      Interesting. I'm surprised that US contract law would differ from English in such a fundamental way. Thanks for the explanations, on that and on Scalia's approach.
      - DannyBee 14y ago
        Contracts(well, consumer sales, anyway) in the US is done by Uniform Commercial Code. Basically, model legislation that was adopted by all states. It is, in part, an explicit repudiation of English common law. (Note that I generalized. There are areas where subjective intent does not matter, and areas where it does, but it's nowhere near as objective as English law)

DannyBee 14y ago

Actually, at least 2 justices specifically do not determine congress's intent, because they do not believe it matters. If you look, you'll see they often specifically refuse to join in footnotes/etc that cite congressional intent or history.

SEMW 14y ago
It's possible they're still trying to determine congress's intent in a sense, they just give a more objective meaning to 'intent': i.e. what a reasonable person reading the statute would think that congress meant by the words they used. (As opposed to what they actually, subjectively meant, per extrinsic evidence like statements made in congress). That's the way intent is read in contract law: it's judged objectively (from the position of a reasonable person in the position of the parties at the time of contracting), subjective intentions don't matter. [Edit: while true of English contract law, this is apparently not accurate for US contract law: see DannyBee's reply] (I'm only guessing - I'm an English law student, so not familiar with US supreme court justices, so could be completely wrong on what they're doing. [Edit: yup, I was.])
- DannyBee 14y ago
  Speaking as a lawyer familiar with both english and US law: English contract law is a bit different than US. In the US, it's not objective in general (contracts are held against the drafter, and subjective intent matters). Your description of objective intent is well, not intent in this case :) Objective intent of congress would be what a reasonable person making the statute would have meant, not what a reasonable person reading the statute would think it meant. The second is in fact, what is done, but is not related to intent at all, it's related to interpretation. As for congress's intent, Scalia is of the firm view that either objective intent, or subjective intent does not matter. The words mean what they say, and say what they mean, and if they don't, that's a problem for the legislature. In cases of ambiguity, he believes in plain meaning, not objective intent. So he'll use a dictionary, not try to figure out what congress objectively meant. He's fairly unwavering in the above, though if you look through hundreds of opinions, you can generally find one or two that are not consistent with this. http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/salvatori/publications/RARScalia.asp http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/salvatori/publications/RARSc... and http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3109&context=dlj http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=... are fairly good descriptions of his approach
  - SEMW 14y ago
    Interesting. I'm surprised that US contract law would differ from English in such a fundamental way. Thanks for the explanations, on that and on Scalia's approach.
    - DannyBee 14y ago
      Contracts(well, consumer sales, anyway) in the US is done by Uniform Commercial Code. Basically, model legislation that was adopted by all states. It is, in part, an explicit repudiation of English common law. (Note that I generalized. There are areas where subjective intent does not matter, and areas where it does, but it's nowhere near as objective as English law)