5 ms·
> anyone can run the emulator until it authenticates, then hit pause and start dumping memory to see your "secret" TPMs are implemented as tamper resistant har
by zurn 14y ago
> anyone can run the emulator until it authenticates, then hit pause and start dumping memory to see your "secret"
TPMs are implemented as tamper resistant hardware modules. As long as you can't read out the keys, you can't have the the emulator authenticate.
It's all explained here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_Computing
- VLM 14y agoI do apologize for using "secret" in a context where it could apply to either a public key encryption scheme or to the content which is being restricted by the whole scheme. Another issue is "tamper resistant" is just a big wrapper around a security thru obscurity design. Its not "mathematically provable" its just here's a secret number we hope doesn't show up on wikileaks.
- phantom784 14y agoBut the TPM is just a chip on the LPC bus, right? Couldn't you do a man-in-the-middle and have the TPM think it's talking to real hardware when in reality it's talking to an emulated system?
- prodigal_erik 14y agoI think the idea is if TPM is enabled, the ROM bootstrap code only gives control to a signed trusted bootloader, which only gives control to a signed trusted kernel, which carefully prevents untrusted code from making requests to the TPM hardware. Like DRM, it's Game Over when the first vulnerability in this trusted code is found, though it'll continue to inconvenience legitimate users (because vendors have little incentive to ensure the machine is practically usable with TPM disabled or trusted signers according to the user).
- zurn 14y agoInteresting point. I don't know if what if anything they do to defend against putting the chip in a hostile system.