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https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/mitigating-the-beast-attack-on-tls https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/m...
by ck2 14y ago
https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/mitigating-the-beast-attack-on-tls https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2011/10/17/m...
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:RC4:HIGH:!MD5:!aNULL:!EDH
- tptacek 14y agohttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=480514 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=480514 (The idea behind the config above is to propose TLS 1.2 ciphersuites, which aren't susceptible to BEAST, and leave RC4 as a fallback for older TLS implementations. But TLS 1.2 support in browsers is still problematic.) Also, ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 is still decrypt-then-verify CBC mode, isn't it? GCM should be listed first.