4 ms·
> unless we opt to accept the risk of poor "Lucky 13" fixes, there's no compatible way out. What particular class of fixes are you referring to by 'poor "Lucky
by stcredzero 14y ago
> unless we opt to accept the risk of poor "Lucky 13" fixes, there's no compatible way out.
What particular class of fixes are you referring to by 'poor "Lucky 13" fixes'? Do you mean that getting Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, and Mozilla Foundation all to stop using a particular cipher is unworkable, or that TLS is just too broken and needs to be replaced, or both?
- tptacek 14y agoAdam Langley does a much better job explaining this than I can: http://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html http://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html As I understand it, the AES-CBC ciphersuites in TLS are not fundamentally unworkable.
- stcredzero 14y agoWhen one is in a game of whack-a-mole, something is probably broken somewhere. It seems like your position comes down to this: We programmers mostly know that ciphers are hard to design and should only be designed by experts. We programmers mostly know that designing a protocol is also hard and should only be designed by experts. In fact, it turns out they're even harder than ciphers to get right. What our community still isn't getting and dealing with correctly, is that implementing ciphers, protocols, and security software with current techniques is hard and should only be done by experts. It all smacks of the kind of problem newb programmers have if they haven't studied concurrency and they decide to build their first concurrent system. This makes me wonder if better tools could be made on the language level, like a functional language and formal system designed to enable provably secure systems, also accounting for timing attacks. Such languages would probably have to leave out embedded systems, but might stand a reasonable chance of covering desktop, mobile, and browser applications.
- andrewcooke 14y agoif people are skimming this thread, the link above is quite entertaining. a nice example of how much care is needed to thwart timing attacks.