2 ms·
In the public/unclassified world, Flylogic (Chris Tarnovsky)has it down to about 3-6h to extract a key from a moderately protected device (TPM; generally FIPS 1
by rdl 14y ago
In the public/unclassified world, Flylogic (Chris Tarnovsky)has it down to about 3-6h to extract a key from a moderately protected device (TPM; generally FIPS 140-2 level 3 (physical), using about $1mm in equipment and one guy. This is after years of developing expertise in general, and spending maybe 2-3 months part-time attacking a single model of chip (although within a family, it looks like new models are usually quite similar in layout and protection mechanisms).
Attacking modules instead of chips is a little harder, especially because the modules themselves are more expensive, so expending hundreds of them in early testing is more expensive. But, for a national organization, totally feasible.
If you really want trusted computing, you need defense in depth; the devices need to be in a semi-trusted environment, so a theft/tamper event can be detected, and keys revoked, within the attack window. So, it's ultimately not possible in a feasible way for consumer-possessed devices (trusted computing for DRM); OTOH it works great in a server environment (if someone breaks in, you just invalidate all keys in the facility within a few hours).
HSMs (which have more active tamper response) are a lot better than TPMs (which are purely passive). You could probably trust an HSM even if it falls into enemy hands, unless the enemy is the HSM designer or NSA, for less than $50mm. The problem is there's no decent HSM for less than about $15k now (Thales/SafeNet duopoly). And HSMs have had implementation bugs in the past.