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Indeed. Also on the "bright side interpretation" is the fact that only about a thousand of these NSLs are issued per year (and given Google's size, that's proba
by ajross 14y ago
Indeed. Also on the "bright side interpretation" is the fact that only about a thousand of these NSLs are issued per year (and given Google's size, that's probably a good guess at the total number of such investigations). A thousand isn't small, but at the same time it's only a tiny fraction of the number of law enforcement investigations. At least this is proof the NSL mechanism isn't being used for blanket surveillance state activity. That's something.
- olefoo 14y agoWhat if the questions being asked are more along the lines of, please give us the full account archive of everyone who's ever emailed an address in a .ir domain? Or, here is a semantic filter that you must apply to all mail that transits your system, hand over everything related to any account sending or receiving mail that it evaluates as a match. Given the lack of transparency, and the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the National Security Letters infrastructure. It would be a good idea if we had a list of the sorts of things. Personally, I'm comfortable with a few civil liberties being trampled in pursuit of loose nukes and engineered plagues; but I'm much less sympathetic to a policeman who wants updated intel on what a bunch of hippies are planning to write on their signs at the next Occupy protest.
- ajross 14y agoThey appear to have counts for impacted users, which are of the same order. So your worry about unbounded access is unsupported by the data. I'm not saying this can't be an infringement on fundamental rights, or that it's a good program. I'm saying that, given the data at hand, it does not appear to be the blanket surveillance program that many people (including you, c.f. your first paragraph) think it might be. That's a good thing, right?