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Why do you say a VPN server is more secure? Which one? I, for one, trust ssh more than any other software wrt security, especially with password login disabled

Why do you say a VPN server is more secure? Which one? I, for one, trust ssh more than any other software wrt security, especially with password login disabled. Disclaimer: I am not a security expert.

deleted 14y ago
[deleted]
rdl 14y ago
When someone advocates using a VPN, that doesn't mean not using SSH too. VPN + firewall just restricts who has the potential to try to SSH to you, and provides additional protection and central access control/management.
mryan 14y ago
I, also, trust SSH more than any other software. But it is still worth adding an additional layer of security in front of SSH to help protect from exploits. Let's say that, hypothetically, a 0-day exploit was discovered in SSH which allowed remote code execution. A script kiddie begins trawling the internet for publicly accessible SSH servers to attack. Your servers allow SSH from anywhere on the internet, and are eventually discovered and exploited. Mine, which will only allow SSH connections from my VPN bastion host, are effectively invisible to the attacker and will not get exploited (by this particular script kiddie, at least). Adding a VPN server in front of SSH won't protect you from an APT, but it will protect you from 99% of the random, automated attacks that take place.
- lmm 14y ago
  Your outermost server is the one where you should be most worried about having vulnerabilities - if you have a VPN as the outer layer that means the VPN server must be exposed to the public internet, and anyone who compromises it is in a pretty good position. And I'd rate the odds of a 0-day being found at higher for most VPN software than for SSH.
  - mryan 14y ago
    Yes, I agree, I was just giving an example of how an additional layer can help protect against automated attacks, even for highly-secure services like SSH. I also agree that SSH is less likely to have flaws than most VPN software. But on a properly configured bastion host, by-passing the VPN would just put you in a position where you can attack SSH. You would still need to by-pass SSH to access production servers.
    - daemon13 14y ago
      Which open source VPN solution would you recommend?
  - vidarh 14y ago
    > and anyone who compromises it is in a pretty good position. You are assuming the VPN host is trusted any more than most people trusts random servers on the internet.
    - lmm 14y ago
      I am, just from my experience in real-life companies. It takes an awful lot of discipline to treat servers as if they were exposed to the public internet when you know full well that they're not.
  - kelnos 14y ago
    anyone who compromises [the VPN server] is in a pretty good position. Sure. But without a VPN, anyone who compromises even one of your other hosts is in the same position. It's a lot easier to audit a single-purpose VPN server for possible security issues than it is to audit all the application code running on the rest of your production systems. And I'd rate the odds of a 0-day being found at higher for most VPN software than for SSH. I wouldn't. And even if you're right, getting a VPN login still doesn't get you anywhere. You still have to be able to ssh to the rest of the hosts. That's why we do security in layers.
    - daemon13 14y ago
- benedikt 14y ago
  This is just faulty logic. openssh is one of the most secure projects. It's developed by the security obsessed (and I mean it in a kind way) folks at OpenBSD. I, for one, am ready to place for more trust in openssh than in any VPN daemon. The most commonly used ones are propitiatory. What if there is a 0-day vuln (not exploit) for these VPN daemons? That far more likely. "Securing" ssh with a VPN is just one step beyond of security by obscurity. If you are afraid of script-kiddies and scanners, let your sshd listen on a non-standard port.
  - stephen_g 14y ago
    Port scanners do generally scan non-standard ports too, you know... I don't think that exposing SSH to the internet is that bad, but your argument is not sound - requiring a VPN does add security, because if there happened to be a vulnerability in it that allowed access, all it would do is expose SSH on the machines (I'm assuming you have proper firewalls set up), which you are advocating making public in the first place. Saying it adds no security is false, because you'd require an unpatched vulnerability both in your VPN server and in the SSH server simultaneously. A zero-day in one is possible, but in both at the same time is far, far less likely.
  - sneak 14y ago
    > "Securing" ssh with a VPN is just one step beyond of security by obscurity. You're not securing ssh with a vpn. You're adding another layer. ssh is still secured by all of ssh's existing protection. ssh behind a vpn requires that someone both compromise the vpn _and_ compromise the ssh service to gain that access that, without a vpn, would require them to only compromise the ssh service.
- cbs 14y ago
  Your servers allow SSH from anywhere on the internet, and are eventually discovered and exploited. Mine, which will only allow SSH connections from my VPN bastion host, are effectively invisible to the attacker and will not get exploited So, just to see if I'm reading you right: you're using a VPN in the place of an SSH jump box, not making a judgement about the fitness or trust placed in your VPNd over your SSHd.

deleted 14y ago

[deleted]

rdl 14y ago

When someone advocates using a VPN, that doesn't mean not using SSH too. VPN + firewall just restricts who has the potential to try to SSH to you, and provides additional protection and central access control/management.

mryan 14y ago

I, also, trust SSH more than any other software. But it is still worth adding an additional layer of security in front of SSH to help protect from exploits. Let's say that, hypothetically, a 0-day exploit was discovered in SSH which allowed remote code execution. A script kiddie begins trawling the internet for publicly accessible SSH servers to attack. Your servers allow SSH from anywhere on the internet, and are eventually discovered and exploited. Mine, which will only allow SSH connections from my VPN bastion host, are effectively invisible to the attacker and will not get exploited (by this particular script kiddie, at least). Adding a VPN server in front of SSH won't protect you from an APT, but it will protect you from 99% of the random, automated attacks that take place.

lmm 14y ago
Your outermost server is the one where you should be most worried about having vulnerabilities - if you have a VPN as the outer layer that means the VPN server must be exposed to the public internet, and anyone who compromises it is in a pretty good position. And I'd rate the odds of a 0-day being found at higher for most VPN software than for SSH.
- mryan 14y ago
  Yes, I agree, I was just giving an example of how an additional layer can help protect against automated attacks, even for highly-secure services like SSH. I also agree that SSH is less likely to have flaws than most VPN software. But on a properly configured bastion host, by-passing the VPN would just put you in a position where you can attack SSH. You would still need to by-pass SSH to access production servers.
  - daemon13 14y ago
    Which open source VPN solution would you recommend?
- vidarh 14y ago
  > and anyone who compromises it is in a pretty good position. You are assuming the VPN host is trusted any more than most people trusts random servers on the internet.
  - lmm 14y ago
    I am, just from my experience in real-life companies. It takes an awful lot of discipline to treat servers as if they were exposed to the public internet when you know full well that they're not.
- kelnos 14y ago
  anyone who compromises [the VPN server] is in a pretty good position. Sure. But without a VPN, anyone who compromises even one of your other hosts is in the same position. It's a lot easier to audit a single-purpose VPN server for possible security issues than it is to audit all the application code running on the rest of your production systems. And I'd rate the odds of a 0-day being found at higher for most VPN software than for SSH. I wouldn't. And even if you're right, getting a VPN login still doesn't get you anywhere. You still have to be able to ssh to the rest of the hosts. That's why we do security in layers.
  - daemon13 14y ago
benedikt 14y ago
This is just faulty logic. openssh is one of the most secure projects. It's developed by the security obsessed (and I mean it in a kind way) folks at OpenBSD. I, for one, am ready to place for more trust in openssh than in any VPN daemon. The most commonly used ones are propitiatory. What if there is a 0-day vuln (not exploit) for these VPN daemons? That far more likely. "Securing" ssh with a VPN is just one step beyond of security by obscurity. If you are afraid of script-kiddies and scanners, let your sshd listen on a non-standard port.
- stephen_g 14y ago
  Port scanners do generally scan non-standard ports too, you know... I don't think that exposing SSH to the internet is that bad, but your argument is not sound - requiring a VPN does add security, because if there happened to be a vulnerability in it that allowed access, all it would do is expose SSH on the machines (I'm assuming you have proper firewalls set up), which you are advocating making public in the first place. Saying it adds no security is false, because you'd require an unpatched vulnerability both in your VPN server and in the SSH server simultaneously. A zero-day in one is possible, but in both at the same time is far, far less likely.
- sneak 14y ago
  > "Securing" ssh with a VPN is just one step beyond of security by obscurity. You're not securing ssh with a vpn. You're adding another layer. ssh is still secured by all of ssh's existing protection. ssh behind a vpn requires that someone both compromise the vpn _and_ compromise the ssh service to gain that access that, without a vpn, would require them to only compromise the ssh service.
cbs 14y ago
Your servers allow SSH from anywhere on the internet, and are eventually discovered and exploited. Mine, which will only allow SSH connections from my VPN bastion host, are effectively invisible to the attacker and will not get exploited So, just to see if I'm reading you right: you're using a VPN in the place of an SSH jump box, not making a judgement about the fitness or trust placed in your VPNd over your SSHd.