4 ms·
That's pretty interesting. What are some of the limitations of an approach like that?
by justin66 14y ago
That's pretty interesting. What are some of the limitations of an approach like that?
- binarycrusader 14y agoIt's a giant, gaping security hole that most operating system architects are desperately trying to get rid of -- at least, that's the way I view it. Any software that uses it should be exposed to extra scrutiny and must judiciously leverage whatever privilege mechanisms an OS provides to mitigate damage. There should be a better way to accomplish what xorg needs on *NIX systems.
- tobiasu 14y agoNone, it works just fine for Xorg. /s
- nitrogen 14y agoYou don't get interrupt handlers, for one thing (though I think there are projects that do allow complete userspace drivers), and as binarycrusader mentioned, it's incredibly dangerous to give any process full access to the entire physical memory space. A single vulnerability in that process gives the attacker the ability to write to all of system memory. This can be mitigated somewhat by mmap()ing only the smallest possible region of interest, then dropping root privileges.
- justin66 14y ago> You don't get interrupt handlers, for one thing Thanks.
- xyzzy123 14y agoYep, although most linux dists now have "/dev/mem protection" meaning that on stock distro kernels (Ubuntu, CentOS, etc), access to actual "physical memory" is disabled. Ref: http://lwn.net/Articles/267427/ http://lwn.net/Articles/267427/ OK for driver development. If you need access to physical memory you have to compile a kernel with unrestricted /dev/mem.
- fpgeek 14y agoHere's a recent, dramatic example about how that sort of memory use can go wrong: http://www.androidpolice.com/2012/12/16/samsung-exynos-4-exploit-discovered-root-and-full-access-to-ram-possible-in-a-single-app/ http://www.androidpolice.com/2012/12/16/samsung-exynos-4-exp...