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Ah, thanks, I'd skipped over some of the more procedural parts of his statement. I'm surprised it was so easy for him to access and copy such material without d
by jasonwatkinspdx 14y ago
Ah, thanks, I'd skipped over some of the more procedural parts of his statement. I'm surprised it was so easy for him to access and copy such material without detection. I guess if it appeared like it was in the course of his duties it wouldn't raise any alarms.
- mpyne 14y agoRead his statement. His entire job was to sift through all available information to present the best and most accurate possible picture to his chain-of-command for use when formulating courses of action. That wouldn't just entail what the "enemy" is doing, that would also include what other government agencies are up to, what allies are up to, links to the other major field of combat for the Army, etc. Given that is what his job entailed though, you would think they would have a much more stringent screening process for access to that material. With nuclear weapons they have a specific personnel reliability program (http://www.ncis.navy.mil/securitypolicy/PRP/Pages/NuclearWeaponPersonnelReliabilityProgram.aspx http://www.ncis.navy.mil/securitypolicy/PRP/Pages/NuclearWea...). I'm not saying they need something as stringent for intel analysts but they need to have something.