7 ms·
Even though this information was accessed, the passwords stored by Evernote are protected by one-way encryption. (In technical terms, they are hashed and salted
by jgrahamc 14y ago
Even though this information was accessed, the passwords stored by Evernote are protected by one-way encryption. (In technical terms, they are hashed and salted.(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography) ))
That's great. But to really reassure people they would do best to reveal the algorithm. After all, DES-based password hashes are both 'hashed and salted' but are easily broken with JtR.
- devicenull 14y agoYour average user has no idea what a hash nor a salt is. There's really no reason for them to include their hashing algorithm in an email like that.
- kmfrk 14y agoTechnology-savvy users want to be informed and assured as well. Why would they not include it? Situations like these specifically call for not leaving things up to the users' imagination. The recent Facebook incident (well, one of them) created a big scare. Better to control the narrative, before others decide to tell their version of the story.
- josephscott 14y agoAgreed, it would be nice to know they are using something reasonable, like bcrypt. Their description would satisfied by a simple MD5 + salt, which wouldn't be very good for password storage.
- admford 14y agoFrom the Evernote support pages: What type of encryption does Evernote Use? If you encrypt text within a note, we derive a 64-bit RC2 key from your passphrase and use this to encrypt the text. This is the longest symmetric key length permitted by US Export restrictions without going through a complex process to gain export approval. We do not receive any copy of the key or your passphrase, or any escrow mechanism to recover your encrypted data. I.e., if you forget your passphrase, we can't recover your data. User authentication (i.e. username + password) is always performed over SSL when you communicate with Evernote. This uses 1024-2048 bit RSA keys and a symmetric session key that's negotiated between your client/browser and our server. The data in user notes is also transferred via SSL. Several of the company's founders come from a strong encryption background (founders of CoreStreet, recently acquired by ActiveIdentity). For Evernote's consumer product, the current encryption algorithms are chosen more for exportability under the Commerce Department rather than strength, since our software permits the encryption of arbitrary user data with no escrow. We'd be interested in offering something stronger in the future when we have the staffing to fight the lengthy export battle, but Premium users can currently use an external encryption solution to encrypt important files and then add these encrypted into Evernote.
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- sdevlin 14y agoThis is not accurate. If it were, what would be the point of hashing at all? Password hashes like scrypt, bcrypt, and PBKDF2 are specifically designed to be slow, such that breaking them takes not weeks but many years.
- NoPiece 14y agoCurious, if the attacker knows what the encryption algorithm is, does it help them at all in breaking it? I.e., does it potentially delay breaking it by not revealing it?
- UnoriginalGuy 14y agoIn theory, yes, in practice it is fairly obvious how something is hashed just by eye. Different hash algorithms produce different output (lengths, starting character, and spread). So with some experience you can often tell (or guess and test) what something is hashed with.
- tobyjsullivan 14y agoI would say that's not really true. The output hash will look the same if I apply a simple salted SHA-1 with a salt or if I apply 500 MD5's followed up followed up with 200 SHA-1's, each salted differently. I'm not a security expert, but I think this is closer to best practice these days. That said, revealing the exact algorithm would basically be throwing people with weak passwords to the wolves while really only supplying the rest of us with a false sense of security (because it will probably be cracked anyway). We'd also be better off if they didn't announce the algorithm if the passwords get leaked (like with LinkedIn).
- gcr 14y agoFor practice, see if you can't identify the hashing algorithm for the following stored passwords: $6$AhHvI8ay$I0ED2wWVU9eheJKvCxzcbc/ZYRoN60q5XNHruYp8yFlQvEOjJ1WtIHUwjG6L4ZGntf3ei8osB7s2GYdkN01gx1 dGhpcyBpcyBzdHVwaWQKCg== 286755fad04869ca523320acce0dc6a4 some_salt:ac01346ad1553221506dd091800a1974 c8fed00eb2e87f1cee8e90ebbe870c190ac3848c 6b3a55e0261b0304143f805a24924d0c1c44524821305f31d9277843b8a10f4e /5L0cR/wpFqSA Note how they don't look the same, so it's quite easy for an attacker to tell the difference. Want to see how you did? Here's the answer key, in base64: MTogTW9kZXJuIGNyeXB0LCBsaWtlIHRoZSBraW5kIHlvdSdkIGZpbmQgaW4gL2V0Yy9zaGFkb3cK MjogSnVzdCBiYXNlNjRpbmcgdGhlIHJhdyBwYXNzd29yZCAoc3R1cGlkKQozOiBVbnNhbHRlZCBt ZDVzdW0KNDogbWQ1c3VtLCB3aXRoIHNhbHQgcHJlcGVuZGVkCjU6IFVuc2FsdGVkIHNoYTFzdW0K NjogVW5zYWx0ZWQgc2hhMjU2c3VtCjc6IE9sZCBVTklYIGNyeXB0KCk=
- Joeri 14y agoIt doesn't really matter what they used, as hashing speeds improve so quickly. You have to assume that the password you were using on evernote will be cracked, so to be safe you have to change it everywhere you were using it. Given that most people reuse passwords i expect a lot of follow-on exploiting of other systems with the passwords retrieved from evernote.
- samstave 14y agoIANASE (I am not a security expert): Would the following service work: Assume a central account/profile service. This service would allow you to have a single login to this service, with a directory of pretty much any/all sites and services online. The external services would receive a hashed token of your account/authorization. They would check for the validity of the token each [interval|day|time-the-service-was-accessed] to determine if the token/auth is still valid. They would also be able to tell the central service whether or not they require an updated token/auth, for circumstances just like this. Further, form data could be stored on the central service, like mailing, shipping, billing, etc info. A log of all sites/accounts that request/require/use this information is kept. Access to this and all other profile information can be reviewed/revoked by the user at any time. Groups and layers of account information would be something that could alternately be added to the central service. I.E. - you could have a first level login to get to your dashboard, but additional security could be required to change various portions of your profile details (one passwd for address info, another for accounts).... Avatar galleries would be available and you could tell each service which avatar to associate with what.
- simcop2387 14y agoWhile it would work in the sense that compromising the other systems wouldn't compromise anything else. It does leave that central service as a very very very big and attractive target. It introduces a single point of failure (security wise) that lets someone compromise everyone at everything all at once. It would also make it a good target for warrants and subpoena to be sent to gather information about people without their knowledge (less of an issue, but still a concern for privacy).
- 14y ago
- wsargent 14y agoIt's MD5 with a salt. "Since the hashed password is never exposed outside of our data center, we don’t think that the differences between MD5 and SHA-1 are relevant. I.e. the risks for MD5 are about producing two inputs that match the same output. In the case of a purely back-end MD5 hash, any hypothetical attacker doesn’t have access to either the output (the MD5 hash) or the original input (the user’s password and our salt), so there really isn’t any productive attack based on MD5 vulnerabilities. Of course, if someone has your original password and our salt, they might be able to come up with a SECOND synthetic password that hashes to the same value. (Since we constrain password characters that we accept, that might not be possible, but let’s assume it is…) The attacker could theoretically use this second password to access your account. But that same attacker could just use your original password, so I don’t see a real-world attack that would be improved with SHA1. (Before Evernote, I spent five years building high-end cryptographic systems for government customers [e.g. http://www.isto.org/ose-site/file-fix/Public/corestreet-secure-access-control-govt.pdf http://www.isto.org/ose-site/file-fix/Public/corestreet-secu..., so I get to make use of my old crypto knowledge from time to time…)" http://blog.evernote.com/tech/2011/05/17/architectural-digest/#comment-455 http://blog.evernote.com/tech/2011/05/17/architectural-diges...