4 ms·

I haven't read Tinker v. Des Moines in some time so don't take this as ironclad, but keep in mind that the school students are in general required to go to scho

by mpyne 14y ago

I haven't read Tinker v. Des Moines in some time so don't take this as ironclad, but keep in mind that the school students are in general required to go to school. No one is forcing the protestors to walk inside the Supreme Court building and so I'm not sure the same logic would apply. You have a good point with the yarmulke example, and in fact some states (like California) have even broader protections on what reasons unrelated to an actual business need you can use to ask someone to leave the premises.

dalke 14y ago
There are two logics here. The first was, can people be restricted from being in the Supreme Court building based solely on what they are wearing? lelandbatey posited a more encompassing statement, that that a manager could say "I ask that you remove a piece of clothing or leave. If you don't we will call the police." and argued that that logic should apply to the Supreme Court building as well. My response was to show that 1) an argument which is valid for a business establishment doesn't necessarily hold for a government building (with "principal" or "school board" as the obvious correspondent to a manager), and 2) that managers don't have blanket authority to forbid certain types of clothing. Thus, I was showing how the larger statement of lelandbatey is incorrect, so shouldn't be used as a justification for the legality of expelling someone from the Supreme Court building based on wearing an "Occupy" jacket. However, there can be other reasons for why that expulsion is legal. The history and nuances of clothing in public buildings is complicated. For example, in the courtroom itself, the judge has very broad authority. In researching this yesterday, I came across Larocca v. Gold from the 2nd Circuit (1981), where 'an ordained Catholic priest who is licensed to practice law in the State of New York' was prohibited from wearing 'his Roman Catholic collar when appearing before a jury as a defense lawyer in a criminal trial.'

by mpyne 14y ago

dalke 14y ago

There are two logics here. The first was, can people be restricted from being in the Supreme Court building based solely on what they are wearing? lelandbatey posited a more encompassing statement, that that a manager could say "I ask that you remove a piece of clothing or leave. If you don't we will call the police." and argued that that logic should apply to the Supreme Court building as well. My response was to show that 1) an argument which is valid for a business establishment doesn't necessarily hold for a government building (with "principal" or "school board" as the obvious correspondent to a manager), and 2) that managers don't have blanket authority to forbid certain types of clothing. Thus, I was showing how the larger statement of lelandbatey is incorrect, so shouldn't be used as a justification for the legality of expelling someone from the Supreme Court building based on wearing an "Occupy" jacket. However, there can be other reasons for why that expulsion is legal. The history and nuances of clothing in public buildings is complicated. For example, in the courtroom itself, the judge has very broad authority. In researching this yesterday, I came across Larocca v. Gold from the 2nd Circuit (1981), where 'an ordained Catholic priest who is licensed to practice law in the State of New York' was prohibited from wearing 'his Roman Catholic collar when appearing before a jury as a defense lawyer in a criminal trial.'