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> What they've told us privately is that as long as no-one comes along with a plausible exploit for Windows based on using a secure boot enabled Linux system, t
by belorn 14y ago
> What they've told us privately is that as long as no-one comes along with a plausible exploit for Windows based on using a secure boot enabled Linux system, they don't care what we do.
I guess we need to hide all those forensic distributions that can modify and access data on a windows machine. To name a few: backtrack, CAINE, and DEFT. If technology can modify and access data, it can also be used in an exploit. Some might even argue that running a forensic on a computer without the owners permissions is an exploit in itself.
Edit: How could such technology be used you say. Package a usb drive that once plugged in, will reboot the machine and load a Linux distribution. Once loaded, it automatically modify the windows system and transfer any interesting data it find. Afterward, it erase itself and reboots, thus looking like any empty usb drive once windows boots up. If that is not an plausible exploit which an ordinary Windows users could trigger and become compromised, then I would like to hear the definition of an "plausible exploit".
- JonnieCache 14y agoRTFA. "This 'plausible exploit' has to be some way of getting ordinary Windows users to run the code and become compromised, it's not an experienced Linux user becoming root and subverting Windows on their local box."
- btilly 14y agoI do not think that you understand the suggested attack scenario. Pen testers are already familiar with the idea of leaving compromised USBs in a parking lot. A lot of normal users will pick one up, carry it in, and plug it into their computer to see what's on it. If the USB key will send your data to a third party, without user understanding or intervention, then that's a security problem.
- belorn 14y agoThinking about it, here is a bit more insidious (and complex) method: The usb drive install a linux system over the previous windows installation. Then it install a VM, and set it to run the old windows installation. Have boot set to quiet and on startup, load up the VM. While a bit slower, you now have hypervisor control over the machine, and the user can install how much anti-virus and anti-rootkits they want. You effectively eradicated the secure boot scheme with the help of the Red Hat key.
- mjg59 14y agoSure, it modifies Windows. But if it modifies the Windows bootloader, Windows refuses to boot. If it modifies the Windows kernel, the bootloader refuses to load the kernel. If it modifies any Windows drivers, the drivers won't load. So you modify userspace, but under Windows 8 the (signed) malware checker is started before any other userspace.
- emidln 14y agoSo you exploit the kernel (or some driver), do whatever evil shit you want, then lie to the signed malware checker. You now have an APT that ignores this whole notion of secure boot. Come to think of it, this is every modern rootkit. You try to remove it and it reinstalls itself. There's not intrinsic reason why you have to modify the kernel that sits on disc. Now there are lots of other checks and features you can add (that already exist) to make it harder to get access to the kernel, to make sure that unknown objects are purged or flagged on reboot, etc. The thing is, this secure boot doesn't seem to significantly make your machine more secure than current TPM-based methods involving sealing a hard disk decryption key that is only unlocked based on checksums of firmware, nvram, bootloader, kernel, etc.
- mjg59 14y agoNo, there's no intrinsic reason why you have to modify the on-disk kernel. It just makes detection more difficult, because there's never a point where the OS is running without having been compromised. That makes detection much harder. You're right that this is no more secure than using a TPM. But most consumer-grade hardware has no TPM, and hardware vendors aren't going to add one just for Microsoft.