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The exact word being tossed around here isn't "established," but "proved." There are degrees of proof. The standard of proof required to press charges is lower

by GHFigs 14y ago

The exact word being tossed around here isn't "established," but "proved." There are degrees of proof. The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. This is high-school civics class material. Have you ever written anything on the internet [...] Conceivably, yes. I'm not in the habit of publishing manifestos, but as somebody that is routinely misinterpreted by people that don't share his views, the possibility has crossed my mind. But there are reasonable and unreasonable conclusions that one could draw based on any pairing of a person's actions and their prior writings. I'm only saying that this one is not outlandish or evidence of unreasonable "targeting". They did not (for example) accuse him of intending to blow up an MIT building. That would be totally unreasonable in a way that this is not. Since when are we prosecuting relatively minor civil offenses like copyright infringement based on intentions rather than actions anyway? That's not what happened here. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Look at the actual charges and the actual law they're based on. The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. And your "not unreasonable conclusion" is essentially their entire argument for justifying this. I said the inference is reasonable, not the prosecution's zeal. That's why I say this particular part of the story is the wrong thing to be focusing on. (And yet, here we are.) If this is different from prosecuting a thought crime, I'd sure like to know how. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008, when he had the thought 'We should all do A then B'. But he wasn't. He was charged when he was caught doing 'A' and somebody inferred that his intention was to do 'B' as well.

Lagged2Death 14y ago
The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. Fine. The prosecutor's stated intent was to avoid a trial and imprison Swartz using only this laughably low degree of proof. "Reasonable?" "Not targeted?" Here's the thing: you're saying the prosecution's assumption would be reasonable in the context of pressing charges and going to trial. Maybe. But the prosecutor wasn't operating in that context. Shouldn't a higher standard of evidence be used before sending a person to prison? Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Yes, I know. I think it's clear that issues of copyright and control over the making of copies are really the motive behind the prosecutor's behavior, don't you? I mean, that's actually what the prosecutor's saying now, right? "Swartz had this manifesto against copyright, therefore we charged him with the far more serious crime of fraud. Perfectly reasonable. Totally not targeting anyone." The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. I really don't see how. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008... The scenario you describe also strikes me as prosecution for a thought crime. I don't see how that imaginary scenario exempts this real one from being prosecution for a thought crime, though.
- GHFigs 14y ago
  Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. I'm not sure if I understand what you're getting at. Aaron didn't accept a plea deal, and he didn't have to if he didn't want to. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. This is false. Look at the charge sheet and look at the law cited. Many people seem to have this misconception, but the law doesn't say "it's a crime to intend to do this", it says "it is a crime to do this thing with the intent to do this other thing". Both the things he did and the intent that was alleged are part of the accusation, and both would have have to been proven to the standards of "beyond a reasonable doubt" if it had gone to trial. If the prosecution could not meet that standard for his actions (i.e. if they could not show that he was not legally entitled to do the downloading the way he did), he would have been found not guilty as well. The point being: the alleged intent is not the sole basis for the charge.

by GHFigs 14y ago

Lagged2Death 14y ago

The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. Fine. The prosecutor's stated intent was to avoid a trial and imprison Swartz using only this laughably low degree of proof. "Reasonable?" "Not targeted?" Here's the thing: you're saying the prosecution's assumption would be reasonable in the context of pressing charges and going to trial. Maybe. But the prosecutor wasn't operating in that context. Shouldn't a higher standard of evidence be used before sending a person to prison? Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Yes, I know. I think it's clear that issues of copyright and control over the making of copies are really the motive behind the prosecutor's behavior, don't you? I mean, that's actually what the prosecutor's saying now, right? "Swartz had this manifesto against copyright, therefore we charged him with the far more serious crime of fraud. Perfectly reasonable. Totally not targeting anyone." The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. I really don't see how. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008... The scenario you describe also strikes me as prosecution for a thought crime. I don't see how that imaginary scenario exempts this real one from being prosecution for a thought crime, though.

GHFigs 14y ago
Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. I'm not sure if I understand what you're getting at. Aaron didn't accept a plea deal, and he didn't have to if he didn't want to. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. This is false. Look at the charge sheet and look at the law cited. Many people seem to have this misconception, but the law doesn't say "it's a crime to intend to do this", it says "it is a crime to do this thing with the intent to do this other thing". Both the things he did and the intent that was alleged are part of the accusation, and both would have have to been proven to the standards of "beyond a reasonable doubt" if it had gone to trial. If the prosecution could not meet that standard for his actions (i.e. if they could not show that he was not legally entitled to do the downloading the way he did), he would have been found not guilty as well. The point being: the alleged intent is not the sole basis for the charge.