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He was caught doing 'A'. He had previously written a manifesto that describes it as a moral imperative[1] to do 'A then B'. The prosecution believed that this e

He was caught doing 'A'. He had previously written a manifesto that describes it as a moral imperative[1] to do 'A then B'. The prosecution believed that this established his intent[2] to do 'B'. The exact word being tossed around here isn't "established," but "proved." The claim is that a document Swartz didn't even write on his own "proved" his intentions in a questionably related situation years after he wrote it. This is not an unreasonable conclusion. Have you been on the internet long? Have you ever written anything on the internet that a stranger could misinterpret or that could similarly "prove" you had bad intentions in some unrelated situation years from now? No? Are you sure? How could you even know? Since when are we prosecuting relatively minor civil offenses like copyright infringement based on intentions rather than actions anyway? Will we start prosecuting people who plan to jaywalk? Bear in mind the prosecution's goal was apparently to put Swartz in prison, to label him a felon for life, for an act even the prosecutors admit that he hadn't actually yet committed, without a trail. And your "not unreasonable conclusion" is essentially their entire argument for justifying this. If this is different from prosecuting a thought crime, I'd sure like to know how.

waps 14y ago
Wasn't a not-insignificant part of the prosecution established to be him breaking and entering into a secured room and then proceeding to force access to a network port ? The same goes for the manifesto he wrote. It's not like "A" was "riding ponies", "A" in your text is using violence to force access to documents, because he believed them to be public domain, and then republishing them. As the prosecution claims, that document was not used to establish criminal intent, nor to prove that he committed a crime, but was merely used to establish motive. Needless to say, the criminal part came from the breaking and entering and hacking someone else's computer system.
- Lagged2Death 14y ago
  Wasn't a not-insignificant part of the prosecution established to be him breaking and entering into a secured room and then proceeding to force access to a network port ? MIT and JSTOR declined to press such charges. The government's charges were fraud charges - more or less, they claimed that Swartz would later do something illegal with the data he had copied, and that warranted imprisonment now, before the fact. "A" in your text is using violence to force access to documents, because he believed them to be public domain, and then republishing them. That's not my text you're referring to. No one has ever claimed there was any violence or force involved in any part of this. No republishing actually occurred; the government is claiming that Swartz's prior writings prove that such republishing was his goal, and that he therefore belonged in federal prison - because of his intent to commit a civil offense.
  - rayiner 14y ago
    None of this is correct. MIT didn't decline to prosecute. Also, the charge was not for "attempted copyright infringement." It was for illegally accessing a network in furtherance of a scheme to illegally distribute copyrighted documents. The prosecution wasn't arguing: "he should be punished because he intended to distribute copyrighted documents." They were arguing: "the CFAA charge should be bumped up from a misdemeanor to a felony because the illegal access was in the context of a plan to do something else illegal." The key distinction between the two is that what you're suggesting is that he was being charged for intent alone. In reality, the intent was relevant to establishing the degree of the crime. That's pretty much how all crimes work--you can't be punished for intent without taking any action, but once you take action your intent determines what the severity of the crime is.
GHFigs 14y ago
The exact word being tossed around here isn't "established," but "proved." There are degrees of proof. The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. This is high-school civics class material. Have you ever written anything on the internet [...] Conceivably, yes. I'm not in the habit of publishing manifestos, but as somebody that is routinely misinterpreted by people that don't share his views, the possibility has crossed my mind. But there are reasonable and unreasonable conclusions that one could draw based on any pairing of a person's actions and their prior writings. I'm only saying that this one is not outlandish or evidence of unreasonable "targeting". They did not (for example) accuse him of intending to blow up an MIT building. That would be totally unreasonable in a way that this is not. Since when are we prosecuting relatively minor civil offenses like copyright infringement based on intentions rather than actions anyway? That's not what happened here. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Look at the actual charges and the actual law they're based on. The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. And your "not unreasonable conclusion" is essentially their entire argument for justifying this. I said the inference is reasonable, not the prosecution's zeal. That's why I say this particular part of the story is the wrong thing to be focusing on. (And yet, here we are.) If this is different from prosecuting a thought crime, I'd sure like to know how. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008, when he had the thought 'We should all do A then B'. But he wasn't. He was charged when he was caught doing 'A' and somebody inferred that his intention was to do 'B' as well.
- Lagged2Death 14y ago
  The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. Fine. The prosecutor's stated intent was to avoid a trial and imprison Swartz using only this laughably low degree of proof. "Reasonable?" "Not targeted?" Here's the thing: you're saying the prosecution's assumption would be reasonable in the context of pressing charges and going to trial. Maybe. But the prosecutor wasn't operating in that context. Shouldn't a higher standard of evidence be used before sending a person to prison? Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Yes, I know. I think it's clear that issues of copyright and control over the making of copies are really the motive behind the prosecutor's behavior, don't you? I mean, that's actually what the prosecutor's saying now, right? "Swartz had this manifesto against copyright, therefore we charged him with the far more serious crime of fraud. Perfectly reasonable. Totally not targeting anyone." The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. I really don't see how. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008... The scenario you describe also strikes me as prosecution for a thought crime. I don't see how that imaginary scenario exempts this real one from being prosecution for a thought crime, though.

waps 14y ago

Wasn't a not-insignificant part of the prosecution established to be him breaking and entering into a secured room and then proceeding to force access to a network port ? The same goes for the manifesto he wrote. It's not like "A" was "riding ponies", "A" in your text is using violence to force access to documents, because he believed them to be public domain, and then republishing them. As the prosecution claims, that document was not used to establish criminal intent, nor to prove that he committed a crime, but was merely used to establish motive. Needless to say, the criminal part came from the breaking and entering and hacking someone else's computer system.

Lagged2Death 14y ago
Wasn't a not-insignificant part of the prosecution established to be him breaking and entering into a secured room and then proceeding to force access to a network port ? MIT and JSTOR declined to press such charges. The government's charges were fraud charges - more or less, they claimed that Swartz would later do something illegal with the data he had copied, and that warranted imprisonment now, before the fact. "A" in your text is using violence to force access to documents, because he believed them to be public domain, and then republishing them. That's not my text you're referring to. No one has ever claimed there was any violence or force involved in any part of this. No republishing actually occurred; the government is claiming that Swartz's prior writings prove that such republishing was his goal, and that he therefore belonged in federal prison - because of his intent to commit a civil offense.
- rayiner 14y ago
  None of this is correct. MIT didn't decline to prosecute. Also, the charge was not for "attempted copyright infringement." It was for illegally accessing a network in furtherance of a scheme to illegally distribute copyrighted documents. The prosecution wasn't arguing: "he should be punished because he intended to distribute copyrighted documents." They were arguing: "the CFAA charge should be bumped up from a misdemeanor to a felony because the illegal access was in the context of a plan to do something else illegal." The key distinction between the two is that what you're suggesting is that he was being charged for intent alone. In reality, the intent was relevant to establishing the degree of the crime. That's pretty much how all crimes work--you can't be punished for intent without taking any action, but once you take action your intent determines what the severity of the crime is.

GHFigs 14y ago

The exact word being tossed around here isn't "established," but "proved." There are degrees of proof. The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. This is high-school civics class material. Have you ever written anything on the internet [...] Conceivably, yes. I'm not in the habit of publishing manifestos, but as somebody that is routinely misinterpreted by people that don't share his views, the possibility has crossed my mind. But there are reasonable and unreasonable conclusions that one could draw based on any pairing of a person's actions and their prior writings. I'm only saying that this one is not outlandish or evidence of unreasonable "targeting". They did not (for example) accuse him of intending to blow up an MIT building. That would be totally unreasonable in a way that this is not. Since when are we prosecuting relatively minor civil offenses like copyright infringement based on intentions rather than actions anyway? That's not what happened here. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Look at the actual charges and the actual law they're based on. The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. And your "not unreasonable conclusion" is essentially their entire argument for justifying this. I said the inference is reasonable, not the prosecution's zeal. That's why I say this particular part of the story is the wrong thing to be focusing on. (And yet, here we are.) If this is different from prosecuting a thought crime, I'd sure like to know how. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008, when he had the thought 'We should all do A then B'. But he wasn't. He was charged when he was caught doing 'A' and somebody inferred that his intention was to do 'B' as well.

Lagged2Death 14y ago
The standard of proof required to press charges is lower than that to actually convict someone in a trial. Fine. The prosecutor's stated intent was to avoid a trial and imprison Swartz using only this laughably low degree of proof. "Reasonable?" "Not targeted?" Here's the thing: you're saying the prosecution's assumption would be reasonable in the context of pressing charges and going to trial. Maybe. But the prosecutor wasn't operating in that context. Shouldn't a higher standard of evidence be used before sending a person to prison? Of course, you've supplied the answer yourself, by pointing out that higher standards are expected at trials. But trials aren't the only way people end up in prison anymore. Swartz was not charged with copyright infringement. Yes, I know. I think it's clear that issues of copyright and control over the making of copies are really the motive behind the prosecutor's behavior, don't you? I mean, that's actually what the prosecutor's saying now, right? "Swartz had this manifesto against copyright, therefore we charged him with the far more serious crime of fraud. Perfectly reasonable. Totally not targeting anyone." The actions he was observed doing are as much a part of the charge as the intent that was alleged. I really don't see how. He was legally entitled to make the copies that he made; the alleged intent is the sole basis for even supposing any crime existed. If it were a thought crime, he would have been charged in 2008... The scenario you describe also strikes me as prosecution for a thought crime. I don't see how that imaginary scenario exempts this real one from being prosecution for a thought crime, though.