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> this seems like a complete over simplification and naive analysis of the situation The key phrase in the linked article: > and so I must now tell them that
by jacques_chester 14y ago
> this seems like a complete over simplification and naive analysis of the situation
The key phrase in the linked article:
> and so I must now tell them that the entire philosophy behind their course has been declared illegal in the Court of Appeal. I hope they don't mind.
Is what reveals the misunderstanding. Judges don't "declare" things illegal, they rule on matters of what the law is. That the law requires judgements to be rendered in certain terms is not a statement of the legality of making Bayesian arguments.
The law requires a decision. The conceptual basis of the common law is a promise that a court will always render a clear and specific set of rulings or orders, and that there will always be an explanation of those rulings or orders. Judges are not free to say to disputants that they are X% likely to win their claim.
This is one of those places where Bayesian probability isn't a good fit. Fuzzy logic -- so passé these days -- at least has an understood mechanism for "defuzzifying" in a fashion which lawyers would find quite familiar.
It also overlooks that judges have many other places to introduce flexibility and weighed judgement. For example, judges may assign blame in portions for some crimes or torts; they may reject, moderate or modify some claims in equity; they have leeway to combine multiple considerations and legislative constraints in handing down criminal sentences and so on.
One thing that bugs me tremendously about outsiders looking in at law is the assumption that, since lawyers don't immediately and entirely embrace new idea X, they are fusty old fools who are an impediment to the good. It's an argument born of ignorance that lawyers are deliberately obtuse fools, or judges out-of-touch theoreticians. Lawyers and judges touch on more problem domains in more depth, with greater consequences, than pretty much every academic and every software developer.
- davorak 14y ago>> and so I must now tell them that the entire philosophy behind their course has been declared illegal in the Court of Appeal. I hope they don't mind. >Is what reveals the misunderstanding. Judges don't "declare" things illegal, they rule on matters of what the law is. That the law requires judgements to be rendered in certain terms is not a statement of the legality of making Bayesian arguments. The write seems to be assuming that the court case sets a president that make it hard if not impossible to use Bayesian reasoning in the court room and sums it up as "illegal". > The law requires a decision. The conceptual basis of the common law is a promise that a court will always render a clear and specific set of rulings or orders, and that there will always be an explanation of those rulings or orders. I thought this was a civil case and did not require "beyond a shadow of doubt." but rather just high probability a term I have heard is that it requires a preponderance of evidence. Bayesian statistics/reasoning is supposed to help come to a conclusion with a high likely hood of being correct which seems like the file state I want a judge to be in when ruling. What is not good or counter productive about this state brought about by Bayesian methods?
- jacques_chester 14y agoThe problem is that the law requires a statement of cause in order to apportion responsibility. It cannot abide uncertainty at the moment of judgement. It is accepted that, because in civil cases, the consequences of misjudgement are less severe, it is acceptable to relax the standard of judgement to "balance of probabilities". Note the case that was mentioned inline that this case was affirming: Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority[1]. First of all, the linked poster should be railing at that decision, this one merely takes it as precedent. In Hotson there was a question about causality based on the given probability of a child's recovery. Given that a child that fell out of a tree was estimated to be 25% likely to recover, medical staff seemed to have taken the view that the child was basically a hopeless case. Perhaps if they hadn't, went the reasoning, the child might have done better because the staff would have tried harder. In that were so, some responsibility could be apportioned to the Health Authority, and not just to the child falling out of a tree. The Lords ruled that the only thing that certainly happened was the child falling out of the tree. Counterfactuals based on probabilities couldn't be admitted because there's no way to reliably nail the damn things down. Anybody can come along with a different Bayesian network and give you a different estimate. What mattered, in the view of the Lords, was what could be verifiably said to have actually happened. A more-than-standard disclaimer: I am not a lawyer. I was terrible at torts. Torts law is notorious tricky and can vary very widely from country to country -- I studied in Australia and these cases are in England. This post does not constitute legal advice. Hell, it doesn't even make for good reading.
- davorak 14y agoInteresting, thanks for the pointe > What mattered, in the view of the Lords, was what could be verifiably said to have actually happened. It would be interesting to see how "verifiably" and "actually happened" would be refined to produce a judgement. I could imagine at least refinement towards frequentist statistics, Bayesian methods, "I know it when I see it"(gut feeling, other non-quantitative standard of obviousness).
- jacques_chester 14y ago
- jheriko 14y agoThis wasn't exactly what I was thinking, but its a great point. > One thing that bugs me tremendously about outsiders looking in at law is... Its always tempting to make sweeping judgements, its human nature, I don't think its unique to law, academia, software engineering etc.
- pseut 14y agoFor me, the key phrase was > Edwards-Stuart had essentially concluded that the fire had been started by a discarded cigarette, even though this seemed an unlikely event in itself, because the other two explanations were even more implausible. Anyone who believes that there are only three possible causes of a fire (not just three likely causes, but three causes with nonzero probability) does not understand fires. Changing "zero" to "epsilon" is going to radically change the Bayesian estimator and vastly decrease the probability that it was a discarded cigarette. Since no one in the case seems to have defined "epsilon", I'd throw out a naive Bayesian analysis too. The author should (and I assume does, after looking at his CV), understand these modeling issues, so... I'm disappointed. The statistical analysis seems as bad as the legal analysis.