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This commentator is playing fast and loose with the facts. Statements like "...To date, the largest documented offensive cyber operations in the world were cond

This commentator is playing fast and loose with the facts. Statements like "...To date, the largest documented offensive cyber operations in the world were conducted by the USA..." revolve around what you mean by the word "documented", as neither side has admitted anything. This article is full of that kind of thing. Prevarication "everybody has a cyber espionage unit" and more. More troubling is the substitution of the narrative for the analysis. Look, I'm a firm believer that something like the military-industrial complex has been long-running in the states, but don't get your causality mixed up. Put differently, even paranoid people have enemies. Even states engaged in fear-mongering have things to fear. The two are not mutually exclusive, and simply because it might be hip to start using the phrase "military digital complex" doesn't mean that there aren't real threats. We begin to substitute slogans for analysis. That's bad. I have been expecting more apologia for the Chinese on HN, but probably because of the technical nature of those who post here, they haven't got a lot of traction. Good. From what I can see, the Chinese are most likely engaged in serious and ongoing state-sponsored attacks against many western targets. I understand that the details of these attacks are going to leak out slowly over the next several years, and that's fine with me. I really wish the spirit of what this author saying was true -- that this is all just ginned up. I really do. But it's not.

yread 14y ago
> "documented" you can open the document linked from the article and scroll to section 10.7. There are the details of the cases. It is a mix of industrial espionage by actual CIA agents and the hacking. Example: Case:Federal German Ministry of Economic Affairs Who: CIA When: 1997 What: Information concerning high-tech products held by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs How: Use of an agent Aim: Obtaining information Consequences: Agent unmasked and expelled from the country or Case:López Who: NSA When: 1993 What: Videoconference between José Ignacio López and VW boss Ferdinand Piëch How: Videoconference recorded and forwarded to General Motors (GM) Aim: Protection of commercial secrets held by GM in America, secrets which López wished to pass on to VW (price lists, secret plans for a new car plant and a new small car) Consequences: López's cover is blown, in 1998 criminal proceedings are halted in return for payment of fines. No consequences in respect of NSA > But it's not. I agree with your conclusion. If you have anything of value, be paranoid. The Chinese (or anybody else, really) will try to get their hands on it. While your post was a joy to read, if you focused only on the facts it would be much shorter...
smutticus 14y ago
What got me was this line. > What is surprising is the unfaltering belief that since attacks come from IP addresses in the same geographic region as a PLA unit, ipso facto, the attacks are state sponsored and need some sort of government response. Mandiant and the US government aren't using IP address details to determine this is the Chinese. In fact, they're explicitly not depending on IP addresses to link these attacks to Unit 61398. Mandiant specifically refers to 'indicators' which can range can be IP addresses but can also be source code comments, coding styles, reused usernames, reused passwords, reused encryption certificates, reused domain names, etc. In short, the evidence linking Unit 61398 to these activities is the same kind of patterned evidence that is used to pin multiple crimes on serial killers. It paints a compelling modus operandi that cannot be easily dismissed as multiple independent actors. It is one group doing this and that group is most likely Unit 61398.
- DanielBMarkham 14y ago
  Yep. Seems like the author "remembers" some information, then conveniently "forgets" other information. He leaves it open for the rest of us to straighten it all out. One of the other commenters took me to task (quite politely) for not arguing the facts. There is a good reason for that. We don't want to get into a situation where one side posts all the knowledge it has about the attacks, only to see the other side adapt. Let's not use the free press as a means to shoot ourselves in the ass. So a lot of articles and a lot of details like this will go unanswered, and that's fine with me. I've watched my server logs, I've seen enough details here and there to know the score. I don't need a public debate with all the witnesses present and cross-examination and so forth. Maybe if this evolves into a shooting war, but not right now.
JPKab 14y ago
The author conveniently leaves out the huge, gaping difference between Western military hacking units and Chinese military hacking units: their targets. Western military hacking targets are other governments and militaries. The objectives are military. Chinese military hacking targets are companies. Intellectual property is stolen, and handed off to state run companies. The objectives are economic. Which makes sense when you consider that the Chinese leadership realizes that they have to keep the engine going to placate the masses, or risk facing another revolution.
- mh_ 14y ago
  Did you read the full article? I'm pretty sure it included incidents documented by the EU where US hacking was aimed at economic benefit.
tlrobinson 14y ago
And Instagram "generating billions in income"
mh_ 14y ago
I'm not sure what you find "fast and loose" with that fact. Stuxnet was claimed by politicians from USA/Israel.

yread 14y ago

> "documented" you can open the document linked from the article and scroll to section 10.7. There are the details of the cases. It is a mix of industrial espionage by actual CIA agents and the hacking. Example: Case:Federal German Ministry of Economic Affairs Who: CIA When: 1997 What: Information concerning high-tech products held by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs How: Use of an agent Aim: Obtaining information Consequences: Agent unmasked and expelled from the country or Case:López Who: NSA When: 1993 What: Videoconference between José Ignacio López and VW boss Ferdinand Piëch How: Videoconference recorded and forwarded to General Motors (GM) Aim: Protection of commercial secrets held by GM in America, secrets which López wished to pass on to VW (price lists, secret plans for a new car plant and a new small car) Consequences: López's cover is blown, in 1998 criminal proceedings are halted in return for payment of fines. No consequences in respect of NSA > But it's not. I agree with your conclusion. If you have anything of value, be paranoid. The Chinese (or anybody else, really) will try to get their hands on it. While your post was a joy to read, if you focused only on the facts it would be much shorter...

smutticus 14y ago

What got me was this line. > What is surprising is the unfaltering belief that since attacks come from IP addresses in the same geographic region as a PLA unit, ipso facto, the attacks are state sponsored and need some sort of government response. Mandiant and the US government aren't using IP address details to determine this is the Chinese. In fact, they're explicitly not depending on IP addresses to link these attacks to Unit 61398. Mandiant specifically refers to 'indicators' which can range can be IP addresses but can also be source code comments, coding styles, reused usernames, reused passwords, reused encryption certificates, reused domain names, etc. In short, the evidence linking Unit 61398 to these activities is the same kind of patterned evidence that is used to pin multiple crimes on serial killers. It paints a compelling modus operandi that cannot be easily dismissed as multiple independent actors. It is one group doing this and that group is most likely Unit 61398.

DanielBMarkham 14y ago
Yep. Seems like the author "remembers" some information, then conveniently "forgets" other information. He leaves it open for the rest of us to straighten it all out. One of the other commenters took me to task (quite politely) for not arguing the facts. There is a good reason for that. We don't want to get into a situation where one side posts all the knowledge it has about the attacks, only to see the other side adapt. Let's not use the free press as a means to shoot ourselves in the ass. So a lot of articles and a lot of details like this will go unanswered, and that's fine with me. I've watched my server logs, I've seen enough details here and there to know the score. I don't need a public debate with all the witnesses present and cross-examination and so forth. Maybe if this evolves into a shooting war, but not right now.

JPKab 14y ago

The author conveniently leaves out the huge, gaping difference between Western military hacking units and Chinese military hacking units: their targets. Western military hacking targets are other governments and militaries. The objectives are military. Chinese military hacking targets are companies. Intellectual property is stolen, and handed off to state run companies. The objectives are economic. Which makes sense when you consider that the Chinese leadership realizes that they have to keep the engine going to placate the masses, or risk facing another revolution.

mh_ 14y ago
Did you read the full article? I'm pretty sure it included incidents documented by the EU where US hacking was aimed at economic benefit.

tlrobinson 14y ago

And Instagram "generating billions in income"

mh_ 14y ago

I'm not sure what you find "fast and loose" with that fact. Stuxnet was claimed by politicians from USA/Israel.