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A simple solution to credit card fraud, and why you won't see it any time soon
- sbov 14y agoI assume your simple solution handles common things such as recurring billing and the ability for websites to re-use previously entered card information without requiring the user re-enter it.
- snowwrestler 14y agoThe "solution" to credit card fraud is monitoring and insurance. I don't worry about credit card fraud because my credit card company does not hold me responsible for fraud as long as I bring it to their attention in a timely manner (30 to 60 days). So I just make sure to review my statements every month. Yes, in a general sense I pay the cost of this insurance because all businesses are imaginary pass-through entities. By that standard, let's not tax businesses either since we ultimately all pay those taxes too. But, complex technical solutions ALSO have a cost--not only to implement and maintain, but in the friction they introduce into the commerce of everyday people's lives. And since businesses exist to minimize costs, we can assume that they have not implemented complex technical solutions because they cost more than the insurance. In summary: not every optimal solution exists in the space of engineering. Social and legal structures can help solve problems too.
- com2kid 14y agoBut, complex technical solutions ALSO have a cost The solution is hardly "complex". Your CC number never leaves your card unencrypted. Your card details are encrypted on a server somewhere. A transaction consists of a record of sale that is signed by the merchant's private key, sent to your card, which then signs it with your private key. Said package of data is delivered up to Visa's servers. Your digital signature is validated with your public key, merchant's key is validated, the order goes through. Yes this requires an internet connection, yes it breaks offline processing. It also cuts fraud to 0. Online purchases get more complicated, sure. Lazy way is to have something running on client machine that can sign data downloaded from merchant, make it a browser plugin or even better a standard all browsers implement, so long as the private key is stored somewhere and can be applied to a message. This is not exactly a hard problem. Doing it right is tricky, thankfully a good number of correct implementations already exist. Use one of those. A more secure solution, especially for PCs, is to have a dongle, everything is processed on card. Then even if the PC is rooted 50 ways to Sunday all orders are still secure. This is no more convoluted (and many would argue less) than the current way by which credit card orders are processed. Credit Card companies currently place the entire burden of fraud onto merchants. They don't really have a reason to care about fraud, other than that it is bad customer service to have your customer's identity stolen. The real problem here is how to deal with crap like reoccurring payments. Too many organizations are used to a workflow where in they store your credit card number. That is obviously insecure (see: news stories that come out all the time). I am not sure how to solve that particular problem though. Obviously it is a big blocker to getting a more secure system implemented!
- gigantor 14y agoIn other words, redirect each credit card transaction to your bitcoin wallet?
- prostoalex 14y agoCiti has offered virtual account numbers for its credit cards for a while, which solves the "Once someone knows your card number they can use it to conduct any transaction they choose" problem. It's still a hassle to remember to go to citicards.com and generate a new number, provided that Chrome helpfully auto-fills your saved number.
- cooldeal 14y agoI think he's taking about a solution similar to the RSA key cards typically used for VPN login at some big companies. https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSP3PxS1xDwxA_Wdhu2WNo_o-R9HJU5LSti6z_SStZe505gPLx4 https://encrypted-tbn3.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSP3PxS...
- erock 14y agothis place is close, but i bet they are running into the same issues. it's a shame, because it really could stop a lot of fraud using it. http://dynamicsinc.com/Corporate/products_dynamic_cc.php http://dynamicsinc.com/Corporate/products_dynamic_cc.php (note, they only now offer one type of card via one bank, they seem to have been sidelined)
- GauntletWizard 14y agoIf you look at how they were actually deployed in Europe, you'll realize that it's not much different over there. "Chip and Pin" is if anything worse than no encryption, because it gives the illusion of security. I don't know about the situation in Asia.
- lisper 14y agoIt's far from clear that chip-and-pin has been the unmitigated disaster you imply it to be. You're right that chip-and-pin has problems, but those are design and deployment problems, not problems with PKE in general.
- pbreit 14y ago"design and deployment problems" pretty much imply problems with the solution itself.
- pimentel 14y agoThe difference is that, using public-private key cryptography, an evil merchant can't, in any way, copy my european card. I can be sure that my CC number will not be stored.
- ricardobeat 14y agoHow so? I'm not fond of the liability shift to the merchant/consumer, but the bar for technical fraud is much, much higher than for stripe cards.
- pbreit 14y agoSo...what's the solution?? "Use public key encryption" doesn't help us much. Especially when you claim "it's not hard". Disposable numbers have been tried many, many times and the user experience stinks. Maybe with the prevalence of good mobile experiences, their time has come?
- zanny 14y agoI think the other thing is that most online credit fraud doesn't come intercepting credentials over wires but by dupe sites that imitate real realtors. I think two factor authentication might help with that, if it has to verify both sender and recipient on some mutual third party server of the credit card provider, but that costs them money, which gets back to the root problem, it doesn't cost the companies that would implement these schema anything now, and any change does cost them, and the market is rigged so you can't introduce competition. I think it is much more likely bitcoin takes off as a real currency for exchange and people just start using banks that facilitates transparent conversion between the two when buying stuff online. It doesn't help with using a credit card online from a CC company, but it does skip them entirely.
- t413 14y agoThe financial companies are the most technology adverse group out there. They are risk handling and money moving engines and not interested in innovation. Every advance in technology is a direct result of legislation (like the recent addition of check scanning at ATMs) and legislation never follows the cutting edge.
- paulyasi 14y agoIf the the card brand, say Visa, would generate a public key that I could use on my web server to send them their credit card data, then I, my payment gateway, and maybe even my even my merchant bank, would never have to know the card number. VisaNet could decrypt it on their side with their private key and determine the issuer and account information to process it. Just the customer and VisaNet and the issuer probably needs the card number itself. Everyone else just needs to know the result of the transation.
- dangrossman 14y agoA large portion, if not most, of the card numbers being bought and sold on the black market are obtained via phishing or via malware on the end-user's computer. Better encryption between the computer and online stores doesn't affect either of those theft vectors.
- mozboz 14y agoFeels like over-reactive writing. Of course big business works to protect its interests and offload costs of business to customers. Big business is also terrified and highly resistant to change to systems that are generating profit that may reduce profit, regardless of any social value. Why is this so shocking to the author?
- bbuffone 14y agoThere is no solution for credit card fraud because the credit card companies do not pay the bulk of the fraud that happens. I have been the subject of fraud both as a merchant and as a consumer and in both cases i was the one that paid.
- jemeshsu 14y agoTwo-factor authentication is a good deterrent but is not available everywhere. For my card, for some sites, immediately after clicking "Buy" button, the bank will SMS me an expiring (within minutes) 6 digit code to my mobile phone, and I will have to enter the code to complete the transaction.
- mhp 14y agoCan you elaborate on how you had to pay in the case when you were a consumer and suffered fraud? As a consumer and merchant, I've only ever had to pay when I'm a merchant.
- jarrett 14y agoTo expand upon the author's idea, the problem is not just that credit card data is reusable, but that possession of credit card data amounts to permission to charge any arbitrary amount to it. Not legal permission, mind you, but permission in the sense that the infrastructure lets you do it, and you have to sort out the consequences through social/legal channels after the fact. Not only should future payment systems be based on cryptography, but they should also require an affirmative step on the part of the payer to initiate a given transaction of a given amount. In other words, it shouldn't be a matter of handing over your card number, or even a one-use cryptographic token, and letting the merchant fill in the details. You should have to explicitly send an amount of money that you specify. Then, of course, a smart merchant would verify that the amount is correct before fulfilling her end of the bargain. In other words, the process should be that the payer gives money to the payee, not that the payee takes money from the payer. Unfortunately, as the author points out, progress on this front has been almost nonexistent with respect to the established credit card networks. We may have to hope/work for a totally new system to replace it. (Perhaps Bitcoin, or something inspired by it.)
- pbreit 14y agoBut "pushing" has proven to be problematic for US consumers. They've basically traded the 5 or 10 basis points of fraud losses for a substantially better user experience (although they didn't really get to make that tradeoff decision).
- Retric 14y agoIf I could save .5% a transactin by looking at thr transaction cost on the card and then physically clicking ok I would probably do so. The problem is I have no choice one way or another.
- sokoloff 14y agoIf the true costs of fraud are 5-10 basis points, suggesting that we eliminate fraud by replacing that with a 50 basis point drain on the system seems unlikely to succeed.
- gtr32x 14y ago"The risk of getting caught if you decided to try to commit credit card fraud was high enough that it was (mostly) an effective deterrent." Unfortunately the risk isn't as high as the author intended. There are still many credit card launder groups that take advantage of in-person fake card transactions. The margin is so high that they would often purchase over a few thousand worth of items at Wal-mart or such (mostly gift cards) at a single time and the lack of care from cashiers just doesn't help with the deterrent factor. Aside from the big boss, even the busboys would try to snatch up items for themselves from the store aside from the gift cards to give back to the big boss. This creates a healthy enough ecosystem that each part of the chain will have enough motivation to not cause the group to fall apart, because the margin is just too high. The credit card itself builds too much on trust and is fundamentally broken. Trust is a rare quality in human and it is just not present in a criminal's eyes. Of course, the trust allows a credit card to be used simply without much additional overhead. If one day we collectively deem credit cards to be insecure enough maybe we'll consider trading off the easy usability for a more secure measure such as presenting your id when using credit card. Or perhaps we should all just wait for the future where we each have biometric chips embedded in us to scan at a credit card machine.
- davidu 14y agoI've thought about this "problem" and decided there's no problem. You're solving a non-problem if you try to solve credit card fraud. The reason we don't deal with credit card fraud is that there are no consequences for being a victim, for any definition of victim. If the victims had consequences, then there would be demand for action. But there is none. Further, because there are no consequences, the cost to solve credit card fraud isn't worth it. Edit: This is a true statement. I feel capable to comment on this topic and have spent time working with this industry. I've dealt with abuse and fraud for years on many sides of the transaction (there are more than two). If you think you have a retort, please think carefully if you really understand what I just wrote above. There are no consequences for the victims. No matter how you define victim. Edit 2: You deserve better explanations. I'll work on a blog post. But one case of a financially tight victim having to call the bank, etc. isn't enough. In the aggregate, nobody is inconvenienced. There are no consequences. If merchants had consequences, they'd stop accepting credit cards, but in the aggregate, that's a non-starter. Issuers similarly have no consequences. There's no arbitrage for improvement either.
- dangrossman 14y agoThe merchants are the victims, and the consequences include lost payments, lost merchandise, chargeback fees, lost cashflow when the merchant account provider starts requiring a risk reserve, and lost cashflow when their account gets terminated for exceeding the acceptable chargeback ratio. It can even lead to loss of the entire business. How is that not a consequence of credit card fraud?
- wmf 14y agoNo mention of SET? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Electronic_Transaction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Electronic_Transaction
- qeorge 14y agoSome banks will let you generate single-use credit card numbers (e.g., Chase). So you have one CC # for the power company, a different one for Netflix, and so forth. Then if e.g., Netflix gets hacked you can just cancel that one card number. You can also generate cards with hard spending limits, cards that only work for a specific merchant, etc. And of course you can delete them anytime. Its a pretty good system. That said, I agree with the author. Signature based debit should have long since been replaced by something more secure (e.g., Chip and PIN), yet its much higher fee structure creates a perverse incentive to maintain its use.
- kzrdude 14y agoIsn't it pretty easy to envision a system that puts the control directly with the user? The reseller requests an amount due, you punch that in into your credit card device, following it up with a pin code and you can now verify that payment.. But I don't think anyone wants to give customers this wallet-like capability..
- mikeash 14y agoI had one of these for a while. I used them any time I bought from an online merchant I wasn't completely confident of. It let me put a specific purchase limit on each number, so I knew I couldn't be overcharged. Then one day one of those slimy Brooklyn camera stores overcharged me by $10, even though I specifically put in a limit equal to the purchase price. I called the bank and asked what happened, and they said that they always add a pad on top of the limit because people often forget about shipping charges, etc. Sigh.
- rogerbinns 14y agoThere are issues with chip and pin, one of the major ones being it puts the onus of proof of fraud on the consumer. Hey, your card couldn't possibly have been used if you didn't type in the PIN or give it to someone else so you are liable. This sort of thing reared its ugly head last decade in the UK with phantom ATM withdrawals. The banks claimed the consumers must have made the transactions as PINs are required and banks are perfectly secure. It turned out that the banks weren't as secure as claimed. (Search for [ross anderson phantom withdrawals] for more details as well as attacks on chip and pin systems.)
- dangrossman 14y agoIt's easy to envision a future without this inherent problem -- it's PayPal, it's Dwolla, or any other service where payments are pushed instead of pulled. If you pay someone with PayPal, online or off, you don't leave them with anything they (or the hacker that steals the store's DB) can use to charge you again in the future. For recurring payments, in the background all you're giving out are tokens you can revoke at will. Getting stores to adopt these services is a lot easier than getting Visa to change how their product fundamentally works.
- javajosh 14y agoThe interesting case will be POS situations where a customer wishes to use PayPal but they don't have a smartphone. In which case they will need access to a machine to send the payment. In that case they need access to a browser to interact with the PayPal site. In this scenario the customer's data (their username/password for PayPal) is being exposed.
- drucken 14y agoOverreacting, shallow, misleading and bait-link article. Overreacting: - the most up-to-date technologies for anti-credit card fraud, namely variants of smart card/EMV, are already available and widely used by all the large credit card providers and banks in the EU and Asia (excluding domestic transactions in China and Japan). There are even US providers who use it in some situations. - in addition, most merchants in those regions have upgraded their PoS terminals for smart cards and in some cases refuse to accept non-smart credit cards. - he made no case for how HSBC money laundering and subprime crisis have anything whatsoever to do with anti-fraud credit card technologies. Just randomly put it out there... Shallow: - Not even a minor reference to the specific technology being discussed is made, only a vague mention of "public-key cryptography". Misleading: - the credit card industry HAS and IS deploying the most up-to-date technology. In some regions, e.g. US, there are legal or infrastructure barriers that take time to overcome. - the key moment at which the new infrastructure is rapidly rolled out and fully enters the public consciousness is associated with the "liability shift" when credit card infastructure providers push liability for fraud to merchants, therefore forcing merchants to upgrade their equipment and processes: -- Mastercard is implementing a liability shift for point of sale terminals in October, 2015. For pay at the pump, at gas stations, the liability shift is October, 2017. For ATMs, the liability shift date is in October 2016. -- Visa is implementing a liability shift for point of sale terminals on October 1, 2015. For pay at the pump, at gas stations, the liability shift is October 1, 2017. For ATMs, the liability shift date is October 1, 2017. [1] Bait-link: - a solution is already out there. It is based on "public key cryptography". Whether it is "simple" or not is a matter of opinion at this point, without any further clarification by the author. Nothing he has proposed has improved on the solution. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMV#United_States http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMV#United_States
- signed0 14y agoEMV only seems to secure offline transactions at merchants and ATMs. How does it protect information for online and phone payments?
- danpat 14y agoAs part of EMV, the liability is typically shifted to the merchant for non-EMV authenticated transactions. This provides strong motivation for merchants to do a better job of filtering out fishy transactions. The only solutions I've seen to using EMV itself for online/phone transactions involve having a more advanced card (i.e. with LCD token readout) or a standalone card reader to interact with the chip. E.g.: ftp://ftp10.us.freebsd.org/users/azhang/disc/springer/0558/papers/2455/24550388.pdf
- dobbsbob 14y agoBanks and card corps want a fool and his money to be able to push a button and buy something with as little hassle as possible. They are more than willing to use their trillions in profits to write off and eat some fraud if it means easy use for customers
- SlipperySlope 14y agoWow, what an informative comment! It's clear to me that the advent of push liability opens the lots wider for no-fraud payment systems, I.e. bitcoins. Evidentially, that situation is only two to five years away. Which is plenty of time for mobile wallet startups to help me get rid of my annoying leather wallet!
- kjackson2012 14y agoIn Canada they have a system where you input a PIN number every time you use a credit card at a POS. I've heard from my Canadian friend who owns a Shoppers Drug Mart, that it has cut down chargebacks to almost 0. Why they haven't implemented this in the US I'm not sure. The only problem is that if they figure out your PIN, it makes it very hard to fight chargebacks from the point of the consumer. But we all know that the CC companies don't care. The one thing to note is that it's very hard for the CC companies to lose money with fraud. Usually the merchant or the consumer is on the hook. Then the issuing bank, etc. They're last in line, so their incentive to make drastic change is nil.
- jeremyjh 14y agoEMV is happening in the United States; the industry does recognize the problem though I agree there are poor incentives to make progress in solving it. It is late in starting and going to be slow and that is for some of the reasons OP states. One thing that is now changing is that responsibility for charge-backs is going to be moving from the merchants and card issuers (who do bear risk in ATM transactions, for example) to the acquiring point of sale network, operator or ATM. In order to prevent that from happening, the operators are being required to support EMV in X% of devices by Y date. MasterCard has a write-up of this here: http://www.mastercardadvisors.com/_assets/pdf/emv_us_aquirers.pdf http://www.mastercardadvisors.com/_assets/pdf/emv_us_aquirer... You can Google "EMV acquirer risk" to find more on this issue.
- jpalomaki 14y agoI think it is incorrect to say fraud is not costing credit card companies money, because they can transfer the cost to customers. If there was less fraud they could easily keep the transaction costs on same level and pocket the difference. Some finnish banks introduced a "verified by Visa" scheme where you need to verify online transactions with one time password (those are normally used to log into online bank account). At least for me the result was that now I choose PayPal whenever possible, since PayPal allows me to pay with just username and normal password.
- codesuela 14y agoI have a German Visa card and for me it works by creating a seperate password for online purchases (once). This prevents a lot of fraud because the verified by Visa password resides on the servers of Visa (or the bank, I don't know) and is not compromised when a shop get's hacked. Also I don't have to enter it every time I use my credit card but rather I'd guess about 10% of the time.
- lsh123 14y agoNot every problem needs to have a technology solution. In this case, the non-technology solution is to pass the fraud cost to the merchants (through fee) who in turn pass it to you (consumer). There is nothing wrong with it as long as everyone in the chain accepts it. Now, of course as a consumer you might feel bad about it but the penalty you pay for CC fraud is tiny. So you probably don't care because in exchange you get the convenience of using a credit card. The industry is actually doing a lot of work to minimize the fraud and keep it under control. But there is absolutely correct understanding that it will never go down to 0. Even if you deploy super-modern PKI solution, you still have to deal with fraud like "didn't get an item", etc. Thus the benefits of not having a credit card number are not that significant in the big picture. While inconvenience and complexities are pretty high.
- tlb 14y agoThere's a simpler explanation to why merchants don't charge extra for credit card purchases: The cost of accepting cash is not zero. The logistics of drop safes and daily deposits plus losses due to counterfeiting, robberies and pilfering can cost a similar amount to the 3-4% credit card fees. That's why merchants aren't grumbling too much.
- InclinedPlane 14y agoAlso, the convenience of accepting cards leads to increased sales, so it's not worth penalizing use of cards.
- Domenic_S 14y agoEven simpler explanation: the cost of interchange fees are already priced in to the retail cost of goods. In other words, cash buyers are subsidizing the interchange fees, your Rewards Points, Cash Back deals, etc. This is evident especially at gas stations. Many have "cash only" prices that are lower than credit prices; Arco generally has the lowest gas prices but accepts only cash or ATM (with an additional ATM fee). It's been policy for a while now that you simply can't charge more for (just) credit card transactions (you could however discount cash purchases). That landscape is changing recently [1][2], but we haven't seen its full effects yet. [1] http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/07/19/3-reasons-why-credit-card-surcharges-are-an-empty-threat/ http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/07/19/3-reasons-why-credit-... [2] http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/01/24/new-credit-card-checkout-fee-starts-sunday/ http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/01/24/new-credit-card-check...
- freshhawk 14y agoThat's a valid point surely but it's not a simpler explanation. The simple explanation is that you will have your ability to accept credit cards pulled if they find out you are charging more for CC purchases, although you are allowed to have a "cash discount" just as was stated. It's in every agreement. I'm a bit shocked that people are arguing about this actually, but I guess accepting credit cards and setting up card present accounts isn't exactly a universal experience. I'm not sure how/if this was recently changed in the US, my knowledge is 5+ years out of date now and I'm not in the US either.
- olefoo 14y agoIn a rational world where declaring that government should be responsible for the foundational services that enable civil society the universal payment transaction service would be operated by the government as a public utility. In this hypothetical rational world, you would go to the government office when you needed to open a new payment account to make or receive payments. You would show proof of identity, and receive a duly signed certificate bound to a a hardware token of a standard type that you could then use to make transactions both on and offline. Since everybody would use the same systems there would be no questions about if someone could pay you. But in this world, government securing the currency is regarded as an outmoded and dangerous idea, unless it's a bailout...
- raintrees 14y agoI am reminded of a Max Headroom episode that covered the character Edison Carter's loss of one of those devices. It was also his key to personal property (house, car).
- Domenic_S 14y ago> In a rational world where declaring that government should be responsible for the foundational services that enable civil society the universal payment transaction service would be operated by the government as a public utility. Already exists. It's called cash.
- olefoo 14y agoThat's one of the points I was alluding to. the .gov already does this in the physical world; why have they allowed a layer of private interests to insert themselves into the process when it is performed electronically?
- mhp 14y agoWhat are the downsides of making the CVV on your card have to come from a txt message to your phone? It seems like this could piggyback on the existing system that exists and would work with all current implementations. (It doesn't solve the subscription stored card problem I guess...)
- ChuckMcM 14y agoTwo, possibly ancillary points: As someone who was part of a lawsuit involving public key cryptography I can assure you that the barrier to deploying it in the US rested squarely on RSA Data Security (patent holder) until the patents expired. To understand how to deploy better security look at Stripe. Stripe is displacing (with pre-existing card technology) the connection between card companies and merchants with a better experience. With an established customer base they will be in a position to drive the replacement of cards. No system with as many moving parts as the credit card system has, can be "quickly" changed (and by quick here I'm talking demi-decades) however it can be disrupted and replaced.
- yalogin 14y agoI was really expecting a solid article there since he claims he tried to solve it. Specifically -- - What exactly are these barriers the industry has set up? - What kind of savings be obtained through his solution? - What exactly is this solution without going into the crypto part (which I assume is what he wants to sell)? - Any solution involving crypto means at the least both client and server side changes are needed, which means every merchant needs to upgrade. What is he proposing that has a better value proposition inspite of the costs involved? I am not even questioning his crypto protocol, assuming its good.
- yalogin 14y agoWhat are these crypto based solutions that Europe and Asia are using the author talks about? Can some one point me to those?
- scott_s 14y agoPlanet Money talks about the disincentives for the banks to have better protection about about 26:20 into this podcast: http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/06/16/137181702/the-tuesday-podcast-inside-the-credit-card-black-market http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/06/16/137181702/the-tues... Simply, the reason given is that credit card fraud costs them about $3 billion annually. That's not enough to get them to move.
- ctdonath 14y agoI learned some things about how the world works that I couldn't figure out how to write about without coming across like a paranoid loon, and I couldn't get them far enough out of my head to write cogently about anything else. Indeed. I'd like to elaborate on my agreement but...I can't figure out how to write about without coming across like a paranoid loon. Methinks it has to do with approaching the half-century mark. "I've seen things you people wouldn't believe..."
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- zimbatm 14y agoPlastic card are a useless middleman and inherently insecure. You're inserting your card and password to somebody else's device ! You should be able to the account URI (based on IBAN) and the total, issue the payment order to your bank with your phone. The recipient gets notified by his bank in real-time that the payment has been made. Thank you, have a good day.
- dreamfactory 14y agoThe author seems to be referring to chip and PIN - but this isn't used in Europe for card not present transactions, which the author says accounts for nearly all fraud.
- jcr 14y agoRon, before you get into the chip-n-pin/smart-card stuff commonly used in Europe and Asia, you should probably check out the modern "Man-In-The-Browser" attacks: http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon2/3-1-1-dave-marcus-2fa-enabled-fraud-dissecting-operation-high-roller http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=videos/derbycon2/3-1-1-da... As the above shows, crypto is useful, but it's far from perfect due to its reliance on insecure stuff (i.e. web browsers, operating systems, ...). When the foundation is flawed, it's turtles all the way up. Also, don't let HN or the web in general get you down. Writing for those with a short attention span makes for short stories, not long ones. Being wedged could be an indication that you have a lot to say, too much to get it going properly. I've got a hunch you have a nice long story to tell, and it will be worth reading even if it comes out in a round about fashion. I ain't a crypto or security person, nor do I play one on TV, but if you want a proof reader contact me privately.
- joedev 14y agoI'm not convinced of the premise that credit card companies have no incentive to reduce fraud. "Fraud isn't costing them money, it is costing you money. [they] pass the cost on to you, the consumer." That's true of any business really. Increased costs get passed onto the consumer. But that doesn't stop other businesses from trying to reduce costs.
- parauchf 14y agoI worked in fraud prevention for several of the big banks. They definitely care about it and it is not passed on directly to customers. There's a strong relationship between card fraud and DDA fraud which very directly hits the bottom line. Typically credit card fraud is monetized by making a balance transfer to a DDA. Chip and pin is on the way. A lot of new cards have it. See below... http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/bank_of_america_20100917.pdf http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/bank_of_america_201... Never explain with conspiracy what can be explained by incompetence.