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> No, really, it doesn't. All I am saying is if it is called "prisoner's dilemma", then no communication is allowed. The game's logic depends on it. If the par
by lutusp 14y ago
> No, really, it doesn't.
All I am saying is if it is called "prisoner's dilemma", then no communication is allowed. The game's logic depends on it. If the participants can communicate, they can agree on a strategy. This possibility of an agreement is outside the game's definition.
> ... since the best payoffs are always in matching the other players action -- whether cooperation or defection.
Yep. And being able to talk to the other player means the two participants can agree on a strategy in advance. It's not "prisoner's dilemma" because there's no dilemma.
- dragonwriter 14y ago> All I am saying is if it is called "prisoner's dilemma", then no communication is allowed. And I'm saying that, while that is part of one common description illustrating the game, it is not part of the logic of the game at all. > The game's logic depends on it. No, it doesn't. If knowledge of the other player's strategy is relevant, that means that you have a payoff matrix in which there is no dominant strategy (that is, a strategy that provides the best payoff independent of the other players strategy); it is the essence of PD that it has a dominant strategy of defection and that its only Nash Equilibrium is (defect, defect). > And being able to talk to the other player means the two participants can agree on a strategy in advance. It's not "prisoner's dilemma" because there's no dilemma. Which doesn't change anything, in fact, advance agreement is part of another common illustrative description of the game (and actually the better one, since "cooperation" and "defection" are more clear in describing the PD strategies if there is a an advance agreement on strategy to hold to or defect from.) The fact that even with an advance agreement the rational, utility-maximizing choice is to defect from that agreement is essential to PD. That's the dilemma at the heart of PD. The key ways in which the example here is not PD is that there is no dilemma, true, but not because of communication alone (or even first), but first because the payoff matrix is wrong, so that mutual cooperation is the best payoff for all participants, and (defect, cooperate) is worse for the defector than (cooperate, cooperate). This makes (cooperate, cooperate) a second Nash Equilibrium, and makes it so that defection is not a dominant strategy. This makes communication relevant for a single-iteration, isolated game in way in which it is not for a single-iteration, isolated PD game.