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Given that bcrypt and scrypt have had very little attention from cryptographers, it would be a better to start there than adding even more schemes. Unless there
by bradleyjg 14y ago
Given that bcrypt and scrypt have had very little attention from cryptographers, it would be a better to start there than adding even more schemes. Unless there is some reason to believe that the winner of this contest will attract serious analysis. If that's true then they should probably allow the established players to enter.
Diversity isn't necessarily a good thing in security. Look at all the attacks on SSL/TLS that rely on being able to negotiate a cypher.
- dchest 14y agoI think that's exactly one of the purposes of competition: to attract more attention and analysis. I'm pretty sure we'll see some variant of scrypt there ;)
- trebor 14y agoCan you cite anything that shows that bcrypt hasn't been studied by cryptographers? I've not heard that yet and would like to add it to my research (I keep notes on good password storage techniques).
- dfc 14y agoI am not sure how you are supposed to prove a negative. However I have often wondered why scrypt/bcrypt do not show up in any literature reviews. Search for scrypt/bcrypt: https://eprint.iacr.org/search.html https://eprint.iacr.org/search.html
- trebor 14y agoI didn't have that link, and that pretty well backs your point. I know proving a negative is next to impossible, but I figured that you'd have a reason for making the assertion 9which I wanted to know). The closest I can find to a study of bcrypt/scrypt is: http://www.openwall.com/presentations/YaC2012-Password-Hashing-At-Scale/ http://www.openwall.com/presentations/YaC2012-Password-Hashi... http://www.openwall.com/presentations/ZeroNights2012-New-In-Password-Hashing/ http://www.openwall.com/presentations/ZeroNights2012-New-In-... Technically these are reviews/improvements to scrypt rather than an in-depth analysis of the security of the algorithm. Even the Security StackExchange site is kind of silent on the issue: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-security-experts-recommend-bcrypt-for-password-storage http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/4781/do-any-secu...
- tptacek 14y agoCan you find cryptanalytic results on any passphrase-based KDF? PBKDF2 is a standard; find results on it from before say 2 years ago.
- marshray 14y agoActually, TLS cipher suite negotiaion has been a lifesaver for mitigating recent attacks. http://www.phonefactor.com/resources/CipherSuiteMitigationForBeast.pdf http://www.phonefactor.com/resources/CipherSuiteMitigationFo... Unless you're referring to SSLv2 or home-rolled nonstandard downgrade logic invented by browser vendors, modern TLS is pretty good at preventing ciphersuite downgrade attacks. If a single standard had been specified it would have been some minor variant of AES-CBC-HMAC<SHA>. We know of several ways to attack that combination now.
- tptacek 14y agoAh-ah! We know several ways to attack poor implementations of that combination now. AES-CBC with HMAC is still sound.
- marshray 14y agoWhere "poor implementations" = "just about about all of them, ever, except those patched in the last 24 months".
- tptacek 14y agoAre you arguing that AES-CBC + HMAC is NOT a sound construction, or are you just augmenting my comment with more information?
- marshray 14y agoI'm not sure. I think I'm saying that a "formally proven sound" construction that is full of poorly understood traps for the implementer on actual machines is not always the best choice in practice.
- tptacek 14y agoAbsurdly intelligent and well-informed crypto people have screwed up CTR mode before.