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Geesh! Crack a book once in a while! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
by yelid 14y ago
Geesh! Crack a book once in a while! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Boyd_(military_strategist)
- dfc 14y agoCrack a book? That's a wikipedia link, I'm not sure what I'm supposed to be looking for? Maneuver warfare is 3GW, yesterday's war. How does maneuver warfare fit in with counter insurgency? Do you see a lot of current TRADOC referring to maneuver warfare and the use of swift armored forces to defeat an insurgent force armed with IEDs? You don't think increased use of SOF is a clear indicator that large-scale maneuver warfare is a thing of the past? Why the tossaway account?
- dmpk2k 14y agoIt's only "yesterday's war" as far as COIN is concerned. Against state actors, maneuver is still the order of the day. Even with counterinsurgency, moving infantry with helicopters is a force multiplier. It's true that asymmetric warfare is the most likely face of warfare in the future, but countries with standing armies still remain a greater threat to the United States. When, not if, the US gets in a fight with another country, it'll be the typical blitzkrieg again. So no, it's not "yesterday's war".
- dfc 14y agoIts true that maneuver warfare is not completely dead. But don't forget the same things were said about maneuver warfare and the impending conflict with the Soviets during the cold war. And blitzgreig was yesterdays war.
- dmpk2k 14y agoAnd blitzgreig was yesterdays war. Only by the narrowest of definitions. The US modus operandi with armoured warfare could be straight out of the German High Command's playbook. I strongly suspect that Guderian, Rommel and Manstein would be completely at home with US non-COIN doctrine. Also, what's this about the Soviet Union? I'm having trouble parsing that sentence.
- mythrowaway0 14y agoThere's a bibliography near the end with interesting things to read. That's generally where things to read if you're interested in a topic will appear, and there's no need to be harsh to the guy pointing you toward useful information. No amount of buzzwords can conceal that you don't understand what "maneuver warfare" is, either; fourth-generation warfare pretty much is maneuver warfare. Your dilution of your point by introducing United States themes and specific tactical situations makes me question why you're putting so much skin in this discussion if you're as lay as your questions indicate. I'm not criticizing you, for what it's worth, just wondering why you're cloaking not knowing something with extra buzzwords -- you should be happy to learn, not apt to show off. Terrorism and insurgency are forms of maneuver warfare, and the term "maneuver" doesn't imply scale (and certainly not armor, for that matter). Since you're quite obviously American, the Marine Corps' definition of "maneuver warfare" should interest you: "Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope." That's from Warfighting[1]. Seriously, read up, you sound interested but misguided, and I made a throwaway just to spite you. :) [1]: http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf
- dfc 14y ago"Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or maneuver warfare." [1] "Along with placing greater emphasis on adaptability, the Army has transitioned its focus on training and operations from developing forces for large-scale maneuver warfare to increasing the capability of individuals to operate in smaller, decentralized elements." [2] The wikipedia link to Warfigthing is broken. I am having trouble finding the manual on DoD's doctrine section.[3][4] Is it still relevant? You made a throwaway account because you did not want to have your name attributed to what you wrote, I experienced no spite [1] Understanding Fourth Generation War by William S. Lind [2] Special Operations as a wr fighting function, http://www.soc.mil/swcS/SWmag/archive/SW2401/SW2401SpecialOperationsAsAWarfightingFunction.html http://www.soc.mil/swcS/SWmag/archive/SW2401/SW2401SpecialOp... [3] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/index.html [4] http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/search.html?zoom_query=mcdp+warfighting&x=0&y=0 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/search.html?zoom_query=mcdp+war...
- run4yourlives 14y agoBoth Iraq wars were fought and won with maneuver warfare. That is two of the last three wars the US has fought, and exclusive to when they've had an opposing force that was actually structured. The concepts haven't been abandoned just because there are other types of operations being conducted too.
- dfc 14y agoThe second war in Iraq was won with maneuver warfare?
- mythrowaway0 14y agoVery much so. There's a study of 1MD in Iraqi Freedom specifically here[1]. [1]: http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_WAR_0104,00.html http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_WAR_0104,00.ht...
- dfc 14y agoThat was the first half of the war. How did the doctrine help with the counter insurgency mess that was left over?
- rdl 14y agoIMO Afghanistan is a lost cause (it is fundamentally unwinnable at any price worth paying for a win; any victory will be at best Pyrrhic. You can pretty readily destroy AQ's ability to operate (completed in early 2002), but you can't turn Afghanistan into anything but a basketcase.) Iraq, however, was obviously maneuver early on, on the part of the US (who kicked ass; the war in a conventional sense really was won in a few weeks/months -- a reasonable person could have pulled out at that point, and we might have had some stupidity at the Presidential and State Department levels not happened). It then turned into maneuver warfare by the insurgents -- striking the weak link of the US, the large logistics convoys, largely operated by KBR under LOGCAP, needed to supply the logistics-heavy US force. (and arguably the same thing has happened in Afghanistan, aided by the terrain and Pakistan.) The relative victory post-2007 was primarily due to the old British Empire tactic of dividing your enemies (i.e. buying off both the Shia militias by putting US forces in small posts in their territory to keep them safe from the Sunnis, and by bribing the Sunnis as "Sons of Iraq" to join the US as well) -- with FREs largely destroyed by this time, it meant leaving only AQ, straight-up criminal gangs, and some seriously hardline Shia (Iran-linked) enemies. Those guys essentially got defeated by the "task force with many names" (6-26, 121, 88, assorted colors, etc.); essentially JSOC. It was pretty much the same as you'd roll up organized crime in the US (i.e. watch The Wire) -- identify high value targets, "human" focal points, and then go kill/capture them. By removing the bulk of non-hardline opposition, the US was left with thousands of enemies, of which only tens or hundreds were key -- and they ended up dying pretty fast. Small JSOC units operating from the air, from civilian vehicles, etc. were highly mobile, so it was essentially maneuver warfare at the small scale. Essentially all "raid" type SOF missions depend on speed and mobility; there is no way for even a 10x better trained/equipped force to stand and fight against a much larger conventional force for a long period of time, outside of a video game.