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[Disclaimer: I worked for Bit9 several years ago] While I agree that it's an awful PR spin, it's actually likely that the product would have stopped the attack
by hoov 14y ago
[Disclaimer: I worked for Bit9 several years ago]
While I agree that it's an awful PR spin, it's actually likely that the product would have stopped the attack. I don't know any of the details, but usually these sorts of things are a result of an APT. At the very least, it's likely that some executable was written to disk. In that case, Bit9's product would have prevented the attack.
If it were an active hacker that didn't rely on writing an executable to disk for privilege escalation, then all bets are off.
- jessaustin 14y agoThis seems to confirm the hypothesis that Bit9 does not store the private keys it uses to sign executables on an HSM. If it's appropriate, can you describe the system that stores those keys? Is it somebody's desktop? Is it in a secure area? How many people have access to it? What other software is installed on it? Is it connected to a network?
- hoov 14y agoI haven't worked there since 2008, so I don't have any idea what's currently in place.