4 ms·

It does not.

by rmhrisk 14y ago

It does not.

marshray 14y ago
So how then does "the CA take reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the certificate signing request has registered the domain(s) referenced in the certificate" when giving a 3rd party a private key which can sign a cert for any domain (and will be trusted by many clients the same as if had been issued by the CA itself)? Here you go: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications February 17, 2012 1) Subordinate CAs chaining to CAs in Mozilla’s root program cannot be used for MITM or “traffic management” of domain names or IPs that the certificate holder does not legitimately own or control, regardless of whether it is in a closed and controlled environment or not. Please review all of the subordinate CAs that chain up to your root certificates in NSS to make sure that they cannot be used in this way. Any existing subordinate CAs that can be used for that purpose must be revoked and any corresponding HSMs destroyed as soon as possible, but no later than April 27, 2012. Note the word "cannnot" there. It's not "prohibited by contractual agreement", it's "destroy the HSMs containing the private keys".
- adamcaudill 14y ago
  Based on what's been said here, and on twitter (i.e. https://twitter.com/rmhrisk/status/300351604715057154 https://twitter.com/rmhrisk/status/300351604715057154 ), doesn't it appear that they are in violation of that requirement? Unless contracts and audits meet the requirement for "cannot."
- rmhrisk 14y ago
  The root programs all allow for technical and procedural controls to meet the this criteria. There are technical controls beyond name constraints as well. Again GlobalSign's policies do not allow the use of certificates that chain to our roots to be used for MiTM purposes (or other malicious use cases for that matter) and we have controls in place that protect against such things occurring.
  - marshray 14y ago
    Perhaps if you described these technical controls in more detail we could reason about its security instead of by way of obscurity.
    - rmhrisk 14y ago
      They need to meet the same criteria we do, here are some starting points but its far from exaustive: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3281.introduction-to-the-microsoft-root-certificate-program.aspx http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3... http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item27839.aspx http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item27839.aspx
      - JoachimSchipper 14y ago
        This is very comforting. After all, it's not like any CA "trusted" under those programs ever did Bad Things; certainly, these programs loudly warned about DigiNotar, TrustWave and TURKTRUST.

It does not.

by rmhrisk 14y ago

It does not.

So how then does "the CA take reasonable measures to verify that the entity submitting the certificate signing request has registered the domain(s) referenced in the certificate" when giving a 3rd party a private key which can sign a cert for any domain (and will be trusted by many clients the same as if had been issued by the CA itself)? Here you go: https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:Communications February 17, 2012 1) Subordinate CAs chaining to CAs in Mozilla’s root program cannot be used for MITM or “traffic management” of domain names or IPs that the certificate holder does not legitimately own or control, regardless of whether it is in a closed and controlled environment or not. Please review all of the subordinate CAs that chain up to your root certificates in NSS to make sure that they cannot be used in this way. Any existing subordinate CAs that can be used for that purpose must be revoked and any corresponding HSMs destroyed as soon as possible, but no later than April 27, 2012. Note the word "cannnot" there. It's not "prohibited by contractual agreement", it's "destroy the HSMs containing the private keys".

adamcaudill 14y ago
Based on what's been said here, and on twitter (i.e. https://twitter.com/rmhrisk/status/300351604715057154 https://twitter.com/rmhrisk/status/300351604715057154 ), doesn't it appear that they are in violation of that requirement? Unless contracts and audits meet the requirement for "cannot."
rmhrisk 14y ago
The root programs all allow for technical and procedural controls to meet the this criteria. There are technical controls beyond name constraints as well. Again GlobalSign's policies do not allow the use of certificates that chain to our roots to be used for MiTM purposes (or other malicious use cases for that matter) and we have controls in place that protect against such things occurring.
- marshray 14y ago
  Perhaps if you described these technical controls in more detail we could reason about its security instead of by way of obscurity.
  - rmhrisk 14y ago
    They need to meet the same criteria we do, here are some starting points but its far from exaustive: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3281.introduction-to-the-microsoft-root-certificate-program.aspx http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3... http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item27839.aspx http://www.webtrust.org/homepage-documents/item27839.aspx
    - JoachimSchipper 14y ago
      This is very comforting. After all, it's not like any CA "trusted" under those programs ever did Bad Things; certainly, these programs loudly warned about DigiNotar, TrustWave and TURKTRUST.