4 ms·

Hello, I left for NYC for five days. Since I develop sensitive cryptography software, I do not store anything sensitive on my desktop, only on my laptop, which

Hello, I left for NYC for five days. Since I develop sensitive cryptography software, I do not store anything sensitive on my desktop, only on my laptop, which is kept with me at all times (even when going on dates and such.) It was my desktop that exhibited this behaviour after my 5 day trip to NYC. Stupidly, I left it on the whole time. I do use full disk encryption.

danso 14y ago
This is an interesting mindset...I'm inclined to do the inverse, because of how easy it is for someone to steal a laptop. While yes, a desktop can be breached (as it apparently was in this case), there's more surveillance options you have with which to secure its surroundings. And agents would have to get a warrant anyway. If you're worried about the prospect of them warantlessly breaking in...I guess that the more likely danger is that if they are willing to resort to that, they are also willing to stage a robbery in which someone punches you in the face and makes off with the laptop. Or hire someone to spike your drink during a date.
- redthrowaway 14y ago
  The point is to surveil him, not steal his laptop. They would want to know what he's doing, not what's on his hard drive.
- PeterisP 14y ago
  It's trivial to put a keylogger+rootkit on an unattended desktop than on a laptop in your bag. Stealing hardware can't be prevented, but the risk is mitigated by good full disk encryption.
deleted 14y ago
[deleted]
- 0x0 14y ago
  With physical access, one could at least theoretically backdoor the boot partition and then "rootkit" ("bootkit"?) the rest of the machine.
  - loeg 14y ago
    Sure, but a reboot would be obvious, and writing to a partition while the OS has it mounted seems like it could go quite poorly...
    - muoncf 14y ago
      It's actually not all that uncommon for well-written rootkits to do just that.
      - loeg 14y ago
        Cool, I learned something. I guess the boot partition is likely to be inactive, and with a ffs-derived file system you can simply overwrite some file in place with your own functionality. E.g., replace some unused driver code with your rootkit, which loads itself on probe.
HardCode 14y ago
Do you backup the information stored on the laptop? Are you worried about being "mugged"?
- magikarp 14y ago
  I am reasonably worried about being mugged at this point. The FBI has already tried to entrap me less than a year ago. In fact, that's why I published this blog post. To protect myself.
  - rooshdi 14y ago
    Good. Publish everything.
  - fnordfnordfnord 14y ago
    Prepare to be mugged now that it is known where you keep the family jewels.
tedunangst 14y ago
What's the desktop's uptime?
bconway 14y ago
You're paranoid, man. Take a deep breath. See a doctor if you can.
- randomchars 14y ago
  Seriously? He has perfectly valid concerns and you call him paranoid? I guess we know who the CSIS agents are.
toyg 14y ago
HN is a public forum. You really shouldn't post this sort of info here (unless you're trying to actively mislead whoever is targeting you). As somebody else said: take a deep breath, take over 9000 backups, and start reducing your attack surface without falling to complete paranoia.

danso 14y ago

This is an interesting mindset...I'm inclined to do the inverse, because of how easy it is for someone to steal a laptop. While yes, a desktop can be breached (as it apparently was in this case), there's more surveillance options you have with which to secure its surroundings. And agents would have to get a warrant anyway. If you're worried about the prospect of them warantlessly breaking in...I guess that the more likely danger is that if they are willing to resort to that, they are also willing to stage a robbery in which someone punches you in the face and makes off with the laptop. Or hire someone to spike your drink during a date.

redthrowaway 14y ago
The point is to surveil him, not steal his laptop. They would want to know what he's doing, not what's on his hard drive.
PeterisP 14y ago
It's trivial to put a keylogger+rootkit on an unattended desktop than on a laptop in your bag. Stealing hardware can't be prevented, but the risk is mitigated by good full disk encryption.

deleted 14y ago

[deleted]

0x0 14y ago
With physical access, one could at least theoretically backdoor the boot partition and then "rootkit" ("bootkit"?) the rest of the machine.
- loeg 14y ago
  Sure, but a reboot would be obvious, and writing to a partition while the OS has it mounted seems like it could go quite poorly...
  - muoncf 14y ago
    It's actually not all that uncommon for well-written rootkits to do just that.
    - loeg 14y ago
      Cool, I learned something. I guess the boot partition is likely to be inactive, and with a ffs-derived file system you can simply overwrite some file in place with your own functionality. E.g., replace some unused driver code with your rootkit, which loads itself on probe.

HardCode 14y ago

Do you backup the information stored on the laptop? Are you worried about being "mugged"?

magikarp 14y ago
I am reasonably worried about being mugged at this point. The FBI has already tried to entrap me less than a year ago. In fact, that's why I published this blog post. To protect myself.
- rooshdi 14y ago
  Good. Publish everything.
- fnordfnordfnord 14y ago
  Prepare to be mugged now that it is known where you keep the family jewels.

tedunangst 14y ago

What's the desktop's uptime?

bconway 14y ago

You're paranoid, man. Take a deep breath. See a doctor if you can.

randomchars 14y ago
Seriously? He has perfectly valid concerns and you call him paranoid? I guess we know who the CSIS agents are.

toyg 14y ago

HN is a public forum. You really shouldn't post this sort of info here (unless you're trying to actively mislead whoever is targeting you). As somebody else said: take a deep breath, take over 9000 backups, and start reducing your attack surface without falling to complete paranoia.