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Gotcha, if the technology isn't in place to properly restrict the issued certs to only the customer's domains, that is bad. I saw this on another site discussi

Gotcha, if the technology isn't in place to properly restrict the issued certs to only the customer's domains, that is bad. I saw this on another site discussing Trusted Root certs: > What is required to get a Root Signing Certificate? > Each certificate provider has different requirements for trusted rootsigning certificates. Most will require something similar to the following: > - Substantial net worth and insurance > - A Certification Practice Statement (CPS) outlining your exact policies on issuing and managing certificates. > - A FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant device to generate and managing your root certificate keys. So it sounds like they are handing out the keys and then hoping that auditing/policies/insurance are in place to cover themselves.

JoachimSchipper 14y ago
> A FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant device to generate and managing your root certificate keys. For those not versed in this particular jargon: "FIPS 140-2 Level 2" pretty much means "tamper-evident seal" (part of a sticker over the opening stays on the box when you try to remove it - this is only slightly more secure than I make it sound.) Note also that this does not appear to include any restriction on the computers which can say "please sign this certificate for me". Sensible CAs will have extensive physical security around such devices, but can we count on anyone with $BIGNUM dollars to get this right? On a cryptographic level, there is the paper discussed at http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/bad-couple-of-years-for-cryptographic.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/bad-couple-o... (http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/70/47/90/PDF/RR-7944.pdf http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/70/47/90/PDF/RR-7944.pdf), which totally pwns some well-regarded smart cards using a (really nifty improvement on) a years-old crypto attack, then goes on to note that the authors really wanted to try their hand at a couple of HSMs too but lacked the funds. Which doesn't prove anything about HSMs, but doesn't exactly give one a lot of confidence either. So yeah, they do seem to be handing out the keys and hoping that auditing/policies/insurance covers it.

JoachimSchipper 14y ago

> A FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant device to generate and managing your root certificate keys. For those not versed in this particular jargon: "FIPS 140-2 Level 2" pretty much means "tamper-evident seal" (part of a sticker over the opening stays on the box when you try to remove it - this is only slightly more secure than I make it sound.) Note also that this does not appear to include any restriction on the computers which can say "please sign this certificate for me". Sensible CAs will have extensive physical security around such devices, but can we count on anyone with $BIGNUM dollars to get this right? On a cryptographic level, there is the paper discussed at http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/bad-couple-of-years-for-cryptographic.html http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/06/bad-couple-o... (http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/70/47/90/PDF/RR-7944.pdf http://hal.inria.fr/docs/00/70/47/90/PDF/RR-7944.pdf), which totally pwns some well-regarded smart cards using a (really nifty improvement on) a years-old crypto attack, then goes on to note that the authors really wanted to try their hand at a couple of HSMs too but lacked the funds. Which doesn't prove anything about HSMs, but doesn't exactly give one a lot of confidence either. So yeah, they do seem to be handing out the keys and hoping that auditing/policies/insurance covers it.