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Yeah, I'm reading this the same way you are. I guess Monday is going to be another fun day at the office. Edit: Apparently this is the enterprise cross-signing
by justinschuh 14y ago
Yeah, I'm reading this the same way you are. I guess Monday is going to be another fun day at the office.
Edit: Apparently this is the enterprise cross-signing use case. So, ideally they're using name constraints and their issuing policy would need to comply with the browser and OS root CA policies.
- tptacek 14y agoYou sound ruefully sarcastic but I have to say that the prospect of a week of political and logistical wrangling to get the most powerful tech company in the world to stomp mightily onto the forehead of a rogue SSL CA would absolutely get me out of bed bright and eager. I sort of envy you!
- justinschuh 14y agoWell, I rarely have to deal with these things directly because it mostly falls to Langley and Palmer. But anything involving the CAs always feels like far more work than it really should be. Both Mozilla and Chrome have root certificate inclusion policies that clearly outlaw this kind of behavior (assuming I'm reading correctly), but the CAs have operated for so long without any transparency that many of them are less than consistent on compliance. So, when we find violations we make them fix it, but it's a painful process because the mess is usually bigger than it appears on the surface, and you don't want to break all the innocent sites that are relying on the CA. That said, I feel like our team and Mozilla's are making some real progress here on a path toward a far more transparent and reliable CA system. And things like pinning and reporting are useful both as stopgaps and longterm tools for more security conscious site operators.