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This is kind of a weird way to evaluate Google in particular since they already have a dual class share structure. Just check their executive pay levels and acq
by magicalist 14y ago
This is kind of a weird way to evaluate Google in particular since they already have a dual class share structure. Just check their executive pay levels and acquisition patterns, which you should do anyways. You don't need to make a probabilistic argument when you have direct evidence.
Meanwhile, in many instances shareholders tend to be capricious and uninterested in long term health, especially when particular shareholders are heavyweights but in unrelated markets (e.g. hedgefunds under plurality voting charters)
edit: also what jmillikin said, which is particularly apt since the study you cite did not claim those results as more likely in dual-class companies, but found them correlated with the growth of the divergence between insider voting rights and cash-flow rights.
- cremnob 14y agoSee my response to jmillikin. Your comment about the study's findings is semantic, because it does claim that its more likely to happen: "These findings support the hypothesis that managers with greater control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are prone to waste corporate resources to pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders."