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Late last year I was building infrastructure with some higher security requirements and was quite shocked at the IPMI situation - concerned enough to email Redh
by contingencies 14y ago
Late last year I was building infrastructure with some higher security requirements and was quite shocked at the IPMI situation - concerned enough to email Redhat (who obviously support lots and lots of clients on hardware from lots and lots of vendors) via a personal contact in a global security team there, with my concerns and some evidence related to our particular hardware vendor.
After some time to ponder, they got back to me with "your concerns look legitimate". Discussions followed, but I am not aware of any specific advisories resulting from this.
I also understand that recently there was an IPMI-related presentation at Ruxcon Breakpoint in Melbourne, Australia: http://www.ruxconbreakpoint.com/speakers/#Igor%20Skochinsky http://www.ruxconbreakpoint.com/speakers/#Igor%20Skochinsky ... no idea of the content, though.
Honestly, I think the first thing is for vendors to be a lot more honest: if someone has root on your host, they can most likely trivially obtain root on and backdoor the IPMI controller. Once they get root on the IPMI controller, they can do anything they want on the IPMI LAN. This reality differs greatly from the 'dedicated' and 'separate' words used in vendor marketing literature and documentation, and is no doubt a direct contributor to insufficiently paranoid systems architecture, resulting in real world vulnerabilities in some pretty important systems.
Why do I say pretty important? Well, outside of remote KVM, IPMI is frequently used for node fencing in high availability (HA) cluster scenarios, which means that this technology is likely to co-occur with some fairly paranoid / 24x7x365 systems (air traffic control, stock markets, etc.). Attackers with a foot-hold can thus use IPMI-based vulnerabilities to (permanently) compromise such higher-end systems.
What are we as implementers supposed to do? Here are some ideas. (1) Run a relatively paranoid, receive-only, anomaly-based NIDS on your IPMI segment to encourage 'after the fact' detection of bad behaviour. (2) Run IPMI on a dedicated VLAN. (3) Run your IPMI VLAN on dedicated hardware (4) Program your network infrastructure to ensure that regular IPMI nodes on your average server cannot communicate with any other peers on the link layer (ie. other servers) except for the expected source of management operations (5) Make sure the expected source of management operations isn't running an IPMI controller (or at least, one from the same vendor on the same subnet) (6) Don't use IPMI at all
Honestly, IPMI can be very useful in some cases, though it's probably a massively unspoken vulnerability in some high end systems. As always, don't trust any single component... security only comes in partly-effective layers ...