So I've tried to be careful to not discuss anything on here that I wouldn't give in a talk in a public forum (we are working on sharing nonclass information, as

So I've tried to be careful to not discuss anything on here that I wouldn't give in a talk in a public forum (we are working on sharing nonclass information, as many of the companies in my area are all particular targets for these attacks. It's almost like a 12-step program.) And I share your sadness that we're still dealing with these types of attacks, when we could make things so much more difficult for attackers by just implementing the things we've learned in the past thirty years. I feel a little torn, though, because I also worry about what unintended consequences would arise if we actually replaced all of our infrastructure with things like hardware roots of trust, and trusted network connect implementations (which are systems which really provide very little value unless everything on your network uses them). Whether that's just moving the ball ten yards forward, when we still struggle to engineer large systems in a secure manner. If that depresses you, I worry how you'd react when most organizations balk even at the prospect of a mass password reset. How many try to argue why can't they just reset the ones that you "know" are compromised? Or how long it takes to get said password reset signed-off and put into the change management process. For what it's worth, I work a lot now with TPM's, and even the places that have actually gone through the trouble of rolling out bios measurements and signed firmware, are still getting breached.