3 ms·
> but don't match up with the M.O. of the perpetrators in question Oh, the hubris. This statement may be true (and probably is), but the perpetrators might al
by beagle3 14y ago
> but don't match up with the M.O. of the perpetrators in question
Oh, the hubris.
This statement may be true (and probably is), but the perpetrators might also be running a BIOS rootkit at the same time - unless you actually pull the bios chip out and read it in another machine, you cannot tell. If you haven't already, read Ken Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust", and mentally replace every occurrence of "C compiler" with "BIOS" and "login" with "Hypervisor".
> It can take several times before you sound an "all-clear".
I seriously hope no one takes this as security advice. You should read on "covert channels" (e.g. in Tannenbaum's OS book) - this advice is rubbish if you are dealing with a targeted attack (which is known to be the case here).
It's probably acceptable advice against "drive by" and other opportunistic malware.
An important pillar of real (rather than perceived) IT security is that once a system has been compromised, you can hardly trust anything about it anymore. Things were simpler in the past, when BIOS was an EPROM (not rewritable by software), CPUs had no virtualization support (so you knew what you see from the inside is what's really there), and the world wasn't as connected.
Nowadays, if you really care about targeted attacks, and you trust your suppliers (a given; if you don't, you can't use a computer), it is always cheaper to replace a system than attempt to verify it clean.
- m0nastic 14y agoI don't disagree with anything you've written, but remediation from these attacks almost never involves replacing any of the hardware (with the possible exception of when a laptop belongs to an executive, and it becomes easier to just set them up with a new one and swap it out).
- beagle3 14y ago> remediation from these attacks almost never involves replacing any of the hardware That's true. But it should, if you care about security. Equivalent: Proper backup procedures are seldom made or tested. They should (and they do happen once there's enough CYA involved, or one of the involved parties has experienced some previous catastrophic event)