6 ms·
Oh, please folks, temper your enthusiasm to hang these guys. For all we know it might very well be grotesquely misplaced. As I stated in another thread, I'd p
by robomartin 14y ago
Oh, please folks, temper your enthusiasm to hang these guys. For all we know it might very well be grotesquely misplaced.
As I stated in another thread, I'd prefer to read commentary from someone who has actually had first-level access to the relevant design and test documentation. Everything else is nothing more than conjecture.
What are some of the failure modes of battery systems, including Li-based systems?
OK, here's an incomplete list that has nothing whatsoever to do with the 787 case because, well, no design and test data has been released. Again, this has nothing to do with the 787. Think of it as the start of a list of things to watch out for if you were going to set out to design a battery pack and related systems.
Sourcing
- Latent defects due to manufacturing QA issues
- With Li-based cells such things as humidity content can
be critical as they might lead to the generation of methane
gas during the service life of the cell.
Assembly
- Handling and storage problems
- Mechanical damage, from dropping a cell to any number of
imaginable issues.
- Assembly defects that can lead to (I**2)*R heating issues
Testing (both at by supplier and OEM)
- Failure to detect defects (sometimes impossible if internal)
- A faulty testing process that actually causes or accelerates damage
to cells, perhaps only cells that have specific problems
- Inadequate issue escalation workflow
Electrical
- (I**2)*R heating of faulty interconnects (inter-cell and elsewhere)
- Component defects that can lead to (I**2)*R heating issues
- Oxide formation that can lead to (I**2)*R heating issues
- Interconnect crimp quality problems that can lead to (I**2)*R
heating issues
- Interconnect crimp quality problems that can lead to other issues
- Main pack electronics problems
This can include chargers and monitoring electronics
- Charge termination failure or inadequacy
- Thermal sensing failure or inadequacy
- Pressure sensing failure or inadequacy
- Fluid sensing failure or inadequacy
- Inadequate semiconductor rating (for example: operating temperature)
- Inadequate power semiconductor heat dissipation
This doesn't necessarily mean bath thermal design.
It could be caused by inadequate or faulty mounting of TIL
(thermal interface materials).
It could also be caused by mechanical and environmental issues
affecting the TIL or the mating of the semiconductor to the heat
dissipation mechanism. For example, vibration.
- Inadequate or faulty failover modes
- Static damage to semiconductors during electronics assembly, testing
or general handing
- PCB via or trace fractures, contamination or over-etching
- BGA ball soldering problems
(mostly only visible via x-ray inspection)
- Bad, cold, fractured or chemically compromised solder joints
- Dendrite buildup in lead-free solder chemistry leading to shorts
in small pitch components
- Unaccounted race conditions
Example: pull-pull technologies without adequate dead-band
- Thermally-induced failures due to changes in operating
characteristics of components as temperature fluctuates.
Example: The aforementioned push-pull topology where the deadband
might have been adequate within a certain temperature range but
causing shot-through shorts outside of this range.
- Unaccounted for effects of such environmental issues as humidity.
Example: Many VCO chips do not deal with humidity very well,
particularly if it can condensate.
- Faulty or non-existing conformal coating
- Inadequate static damage counter measures
(inputs, anything expose to handling)
- Sub-pack electronics problems
This is applicable if a large pack is made from a multitude of
smaller packs, each with it's own control and monitoring electronics.
Sub-pack electronics can suffer from the same issues as the main pack
electronics above.
Software
- Myriad of code-based issues
(lock-ups, endless loops, pointer problems, uncaught exceptions, etc.)
- Software problems caused by hardware issues
Example: Static damage to a chip causing a bit to unexpectedly flip.
If not caught in software this can lead to catastrophic failure
Mechanical
- Faulty inspection and certification process
- Inadequate design materials
- Adequate materials but supplier quality issues resulted in unexpected
materials issues
- Inadequate design tolerances
- Adequate design tolerances but faulty assembly, subcontractor or testing
process caused them to be violated
- Faulty fasteners
- Faulty fastener application
- Unexpected interference between components
- Mechanical pinching or chafing of wires
- Mechanical puncture damage to cells during installation or operation
- Mechanical abrasion to protective cell wall or packaging
- Insufficient mechanical rigidity
- Insufficient venting mechanism
- Insufficient containment or venting of gasses (methane),
flames or heat
- Mechanical issues once pack is installed
- Thermal
- Mechanical (pinching, squeezing, twisting, cutting)
- Resonance
Thermal
- Inadequate thermal management
- Lack of consideration of thermal runaway problem
- Lack of thermal isolation between individual cells or sub-packs
- Insufficient thermal sensing
- Insufficient thermal overload coping mechanism
(both mechanical and electronic)
- A design that might cause severe differential heating of cells deep
inside the pack
- Inadequate electronic and mechanical fail-over measures in the case
of thermal runaway
- Inadequate thermal runaway detection
- Cell supplier issues (quality control, testing, etc.)
- Thermal issues once installed
- Problematic heat exchange
- Heat input from adjoining assemblies
- Accidental plugging of filters, inlets, etc.
Final release
- Electrical testing
- Mechanical testing
- Environmental testing
- Random destructive testing at the cell level
Operational
- User fails to follow published procedures
- Alarms are ignored
- Mechanical issues are ignored
- Inadequate maintenance
- Handling issues
Anyhow, this is not, by a long-shot, an exhaustive list. There's a lot I am ignorant about and, of course, that stuff is missing. Feel free to expand.
The point is that a proper investigation would use --at a bare minimum-- something like this and, more than likely, a book full of specs and procedures before reaching a verifiable and reproducible conclusion.
Maybe it's just me. I don't know. I just don't like it when people do some of what is being done to Boeing. Particularly when they don't have access to the reams of FAA, Boeing and airline data that is required to really understand the problem.
EDIT: Formatting
- primitur 14y ago>>Maybe it's just me. I don't know. From your comment history it sure seems like you have a vested interest in maintaining favorable PR for Boeing in this forum. Why shouldn't the industry discuss this in open terms? The fact is we don't have access "to the relevant design and test documentation". Boeing and their partners won't share it. So, how can we discuss this without the data, then? Conjecture and informed opinion is all we have, and it seems as if you have rather a bit of the latter .. so why not share a technical analysis of the circumstances based on your understanding rather than attempt an appeal at what could be construed, frankly, as a PR move? What if, Boeing are simply mis-managing the project? It surely is not the first - nor the last - time that a major aerospace company was bit by that bug - in fact, for anyone that pays attention to the big, fat, military-industrial corn-fed cows of the last few decades, its rather the norm than the exception!! Nothing says "management really, really screwed up" than a smoking pile of brand new tech, being doused with fire-retardant foam, while the world asks questions like "why is our technology failing us?" from afar .. lucky, we're not there yet with the 787 - so this is really the best time for us to be discussing these issues. Lucky no lives are lost .. yet.
- robomartin 14y agoNope. Never worked for Boeing. Never worked directly in aerospace. I did manufacture motor and battery controls that were used in drones and robots maybe twenty years ago mostly in academia. I have no way to know if the motor controls we sold to institutions such as MIT ended-up in Boeing product. I doubt it. It's easy. Go to my profile on HN. Send me an email. I'll reply back with my LinkedIn profile. Then you can go figure out if I have anything to gain from my comments. I'm just an engineer with a lot of experience making mistakes who hates it when people run their mouths without data. That's all. Things at this scale are never as simple as some journalist might make it seem. Most people don't have a clue as to how such massive machines as a 787 are designed, built and tested. Not a clue. Many years ago I had a chance to meet and enjoy long talks with the engineer who had been in charge of the F18 project. It was a fascinating learning experience for me. If I remember correctly, he said he had some 3,000 engineers working for him. Now, how many people would imagine that 3,000 engineers had their hand on the F18 design simply by looking at it? Better yet, how many journalist? And, how many of these people could diagnose an F18 problem --even if qualified-- without access to real engineering and test data?