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The author is really only saying browser cryptography is bad for one specific problem: securely transmitting data to an untrusted provider. But there are lots o
by erikpukinskis 14y ago
The author is really only saying browser cryptography is bad for one specific problem: securely transmitting data to an untrusted provider. But there are lots of other use cases.
For example, maybe I want to upload a file to a server, and I trust them not to try to steal my data, but I don't trust my government not to confiscate their servers. In that case, SSL + browser cryptography is adequate to give me the assurances I need that the government won't be able to get access to my data, even if the service's engineers could.
- asdfaoeu 14y agoHe also ignores the situation where you want to upload it to an untrusted third party server where the javascript was obtained from a trusted server. Also the same problems of verifying the source exist in most closed source applications that automatically update so really nothing to do with javascript.
- haberman 14y agoSeriously, the article is badly mistitled. > And if you have SSL, why do you need Javascript crypto? Just use the SSL. Maybe because SSL only solves one problem, and other cryptographic algorithms/systems solve other problems?
- makomk 14y agoAlso, until recently SSL didn't support any kind of forward secrecy, and even now many SSL servers and clients aren't configured to use it. What this means is that if an attacker ever gets hold of an SSL server's old private key, they can decrypt any SSL sessions they've recorded which used that key. This makes security measures like JavaScript crypto which only protect against passive eavesdropping quite a bit more useful than you might naively expect.
- ema 14y agoBut if the government can confiscate the server they also can make it deliver modified JS. If you can't trust the server you also can't trust the JS it gives you.
- cantos 14y agoYes. The purpose of using crypto is so that there is no less expensive and time consuming way to get the data then going after the server itself.
- DanBC 14y agoHushmail uses Java (not Javascript) cryptography. They pushed modified client software to some users after a Canadian court issued a court order. (http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/ http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encrypted-e-mai/) (http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/11/secure-hushmail-can-still-talk-to-the-feds/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/11/secure-hushmail-can-...) Getting a court order doesn't seem particularly hard; it's certainly not the full might of the NSA applied to cracking the crypto.
- mosselman 14y agoKind of defeats the purpose for paranoid anti-government types I guess. Good way to lose your clientele.
- tjoff 14y ago"For example, maybe I want to upload a file to a server, and I trust them not to try to steal my data, but I don't trust my government not to confiscate their servers. In that case, SSL + browser cryptography is adequate to give me the assurances I need that the government won't be able to get access to my data, even if the service's engineers could." If the government might have the ability to confiscate their servers they also have the ability to compromise their service during use. So, if you don't trust your government you can't trust their servers either, regardless of whether you trust the service's engineers or not.
- makomk 14y agoThat's the thing - you don't actually have to trust the servers to the same extent. You can look at and verify any JavaScript and CSS and HTML that the server's sending you, manually if necessary, but there's absolutely no way of telling what code the remote server is running. This actually matters for sites like Mega. There have been previous examples of file storage services falsely promising that all your files would be encrypted and their staff would be unable to access them, for example Dropbox. If all services use server-side crypto there is no way to tell the difference between a service that lies about this and one that's honest. With Mega it's possible - not easy, but possible - to check exactly what kind of encryption is being applied and where it's getting the keys from. You have to go through every bit of content manually with a fine-toothed comb to be sure, of course, and there are various ways to obfuscate things, but it's still better than not being able to see the code at all.
- DasIch 14y ago> That's the thing - you don't actually have to trust the servers to the same extent. You can look at and verify any JavaScript and CSS and HTML that the server's sending you, manually if necessary, but there's absolutely no way of telling what code the remote server is running. You can verify the JS, CSS and HTML only for a specific request and only if you have sufficient knowledge, meaning you have studied cryptography and even then it will take a lot of time because it is not possible to not verify that code manually. This offers no additional security at all for anyone but the most paranoid cryptography experts.
- mosselman 14y agoHaha admit it, everyone is thinking about Mega ;). I agree you are right. Once you CAN deliver the code securely (like the author admits is possible) through SSL you should be able to encrypt things in the browser and send then to the server encrypted. This is what the author is saying as well.
- derefr 14y agoTo be even more generous, I might not actually be worried about my users and their data--only about whether I am legally liable for what ends up being found uploaded to my servers. If all content pushed to me is encrypted before it gets there--and I don't have the keys--then I can honestly say I have no idea what it was. SSL only gets me half-way there; I need some form of PGP-type crypto to let me receive the data and store it without decrypting it first. It'd be great it if were implemented natively and exposed as a browser API, but doing it in Javascript doesn't seem so bad. Even if the data became compromised on my server, It would still be provable that I didn't have access to it.