3 ms·
For the same reason: If a backup service allows you to access your data via a web browser, it's not secure.
by cperciva 14y ago
For the same reason: If a backup service allows you to access your data via a web browser, it's not secure.
- aarondf 14y agoInteresting. Could you elaborate? Backblaze allows web access but only after I enter my key to "unlock" my files. Am I being hoodwinked?
- bigiain 14y agoIn the "government took control of the server some time ago without announcing it" case, once you've logged in and "given up your key", you're hosed.
- erichocean 14y agoIn fairness, any computer that has been physically compromised is no longer secure, period. Every attack against an otherwise secure system requires these two steps: 1. Compromise a computer or environment by gaining physical access and changing something about the computer/environment (e.g. creating a false passphrase screen, or installing a hidden camera). 2. Trick the user into giving up their passphrase/private key after step (1) is complete. Once a machine or environment is compromised, it's just a matter of time before (2) happens and your security is broken. Physical access to a machine or environment where a passphrase is entered is required because network security is (effectively) perfect with modern crypto. If you are truly paranoid, you'd have to constantly secure your environment and physical hardware, and whenever either went out of your physical control, not use your passphrase/private key. Full stop.
- dchest 14y ago"In fairness" about what? How is client's computer compromise related to server compromise? If someone gets access to, for example, Tarsnap servers, the attackers can do nothing apart from deleting your backups. If the same happens to Backblaze (who have some interesting understanding of "security", BTW: http://i.imgur.com/t3NCm3X.png http://i.imgur.com/t3NCm3X.png), they can get full access to your backups.
- erichocean 14y agoI don't consider Tarsnap's actual storage to be part of the cryptosystem – it's no different than the data simply being "in transit" indefinitely – so "compromising" a Tarsnap server has no real meaning from a cryptographic point of view. I totally agree with you about Backblaze; at least with Tarsnap, the physical machines and environments that are actually part of the cryptosystem are in your own control. Oh, and the "in fairness" was that compromised clients have the same problem as compromised servers. Perhaps I could have worded it better – I don't have any problem with what you wrote at all.
- bigiain 14y agoIs that inevitably true? I'm imagining a system (kind of like tar snap) that backs up my files all pgp encrypted ith my public key, and which allows me do download those encrypted files (which I can then decrypt locally). If the pgp encryption is done client side (by a native app, not in-browser), and the "backup service" oly ever sees pgp encrypted files - is there some other hole I've not seen there? (I guess theres metadata leakage with that scheme, the number and sizes of backed up files could be determined, even if the contents are secure)
- DanBC 14y ago> If the pgp encryption is done client side (by a native app, not in-browser), and the "backup service" oly ever sees pgp encrypted files - is there some other hole I've not seen there? Doesn't that mean the browser can't access the data? The browser can access an encrypted lump of stuff, but it doesn't encrypt it or decrypt it.
- bigiain 14y agoI guess that depends on what you mean by "access your data via a web browser". I'm imagining a Dropbox type system, where a native client uploads my files after pgp encrypting them, and there's a website where I could log in from any browser and download any/all of my encrypted files. It's not actually a very good idea, for the website to be of any use, there needs to be enough cleat-text metadata (or at least decryptable by the web server metadata, which may as well be clear text), so that I can find the file I want. If that file is called "Metalica_Album.mp3.pgp", or if there a directory called "Disney_BluRay_rips", the large encrypted lumps probably won't do me any good as a defense in court.