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This. The law should be rewritten to prohibit prosecutors from entering into plea deals of less than X% of the maximum sentence they are prosecuting someone for

This. The law should be rewritten to prohibit prosecutors from entering into plea deals of less than X% of the maximum sentence they are prosecuting someone for, with the exception of plea/immunity deals that include providing incriminating evidence in another case or against another person. Not sure what X% should really be, but it should be sufficiently high as to prevent prosecutors from using the large delta between plea and conviction sentences as leverage. My initial thought would be 50%.

jacquesm 14y ago
You're missing my point. They can offer plea deals as low as they want, but then not ask for more than twice that in a subsequent trial.
- jmvoodoo 14y ago
  I think I got your point. I just approached the problem from the other side. I think limiting a prosecutor's ability to bargain would be easier from a legislative standpoint than getting involved in sentencing, and more effective since the sentence asked by the prosecution is really just a recommendation. Either way, the important part is ratio of sentence to plea bargain, if I understood you correctly.
  - jacquesm 14y ago
    Prosecutors will go for very low plea bargains if their case is shaky, with huge penalties for not accepting the plea, so many shaky cases never make it to trial. By reversing the situation you end up with half of the maximum rather than maybe 10% of it, in effect most plea offers would increase rather than stay at their current level and many more cases would have to be tried.
    - tarblog 14y ago
      I think that the idea here is to prevent prosecutors from charging people when they only have a really shaky case then using the leverage of a small plea to force people into pleading guilty. If prosecutors don't want to lose cases, and they can't force people to accept really low pleas then they would have to stop trying to get people on really shaky cases.
    - PeterisP 14y ago
      Well that is the whole point - if the case is shaky (i.e., the accused is likely to be innocent), then the case should be either dropped or go to trial. Any system that results in accepted guilty pleas for such cases is broken and evil, and should be destroyed.
smosher 14y ago
There may be a problem, no matter which side you approach it from. Suppose the prosecution makes an offer, they're willing to go lower, but only if they think the defense will accept. The defense then rejects the offer, perhaps with the implication they might accept a lower offer. If a lower offer is made, the defense can reject it but now they have less risk—since the offer was made the prosecution is bound to x% beyond that. Some people might view that as gaming the system and I'm not sure it could be tuned to avoid that. On the other hand it might improve honesty on both sides of the table. The ratchet effect may keep the defense from being intimidated. The net effect should promote not guilty pleas among the innocent, but ideally it should not have that effect on the guilty.

jacquesm 14y ago

You're missing my point. They can offer plea deals as low as they want, but then not ask for more than twice that in a subsequent trial.

jmvoodoo 14y ago
I think I got your point. I just approached the problem from the other side. I think limiting a prosecutor's ability to bargain would be easier from a legislative standpoint than getting involved in sentencing, and more effective since the sentence asked by the prosecution is really just a recommendation. Either way, the important part is ratio of sentence to plea bargain, if I understood you correctly.
- jacquesm 14y ago
  Prosecutors will go for very low plea bargains if their case is shaky, with huge penalties for not accepting the plea, so many shaky cases never make it to trial. By reversing the situation you end up with half of the maximum rather than maybe 10% of it, in effect most plea offers would increase rather than stay at their current level and many more cases would have to be tried.
  - tarblog 14y ago
    I think that the idea here is to prevent prosecutors from charging people when they only have a really shaky case then using the leverage of a small plea to force people into pleading guilty. If prosecutors don't want to lose cases, and they can't force people to accept really low pleas then they would have to stop trying to get people on really shaky cases.
  - PeterisP 14y ago
    Well that is the whole point - if the case is shaky (i.e., the accused is likely to be innocent), then the case should be either dropped or go to trial. Any system that results in accepted guilty pleas for such cases is broken and evil, and should be destroyed.

smosher 14y ago

There may be a problem, no matter which side you approach it from. Suppose the prosecution makes an offer, they're willing to go lower, but only if they think the defense will accept. The defense then rejects the offer, perhaps with the implication they might accept a lower offer. If a lower offer is made, the defense can reject it but now they have less risk—since the offer was made the prosecution is bound to x% beyond that. Some people might view that as gaming the system and I'm not sure it could be tuned to avoid that. On the other hand it might improve honesty on both sides of the table. The ratchet effect may keep the defense from being intimidated. The net effect should promote not guilty pleas among the innocent, but ideally it should not have that effect on the guilty.