3 ms·

Maybe they can delete the first 100m of every trip, so it would be harder to poinpoint locations w/out losing that much

• josephlord 14y ago
  100m radius of two end points on a simple trip would narrow it down a lot and would in many cases allow you to identify an individual. If additional journeys are also linked to the same phone identifying individuals can get even easier.
• adrianN 14y ago
  "On the Anonymity of Home/Work Location Pairs" Abstract. Many applications benefit from user location data, but lo- cation data raises privacy concerns. Anonymization can protect privacy, but identities can sometimes be inferred from supposedly anonymous data. This paper studies a new attack on the anonymity of location data. We show that if the approximate locations of an individual’s home and workplace can both be deduced from a location trace, then the median size of the individual’s anonymity set in the U.S. working population is 1, 21 and 34,980, for locations known at the granularity of a census block, census track and county respectively. The location data of people who live and work in different regions can be re-identified even more easily. Our results show that the threat of re-identification for location data is much greater when the individual’s home and work locations can both be deduced from the data. To preserve anonymity, we offer guidance for obfuscating location traces before they are disclosed. http://xenon.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/commute.pdf http://xenon.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/commute.pdf