11 ms·

In previous instances (like Comodo), I can recall discussions on the Mozilla mailing lists about the so called "death penalty" of revocation for CAs who have de

by sc68cal 14y ago

In previous instances (like Comodo), I can recall discussions on the Mozilla mailing lists about the so called "death penalty" of revocation for CAs who have demonstrated serious lapses. I think this situation is even worse. Forgive me for sounding paranoid but this sounds like collusion between the government of Turkey and Turktrust, to intercept communications. I believe that the harshest penalty should be pursued, which is removal of the Turktrust root certificate from all trust databases. They cannot be trusted. EDIT: It appears that Mozilla is on the same page as I am. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/01/03/revoking-trust-in-two-turktrust-certficates/ https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/01/03/revoking-trust-... https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!topic/mozilla.dev.security.policy/aqn0Zm-KxQ0 https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups=#!topic/mozilla.... Another good idea mentioned on the mailing list was to blacklist the auditor: https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/aqn0Zm-KxQ0/OOMOOFBKXoAJ https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/...

cheald 14y ago
I'd agree. We have plenty of CAs - killing a few off here and there isn't going to harm our ability to manage certificates, and those that make these kinds of mistakes - intentionally or otherwise - aren't worth the trouble of having them around. A couple of CAs being revoked for slipping the wrong certs to the wrong parties is only going to make other CAs triple check their work before handing out the keys to the kingdom.
- tptacek 14y ago
  No, it won't harm our ability to manage certificates. What it will do instead is create a point in time where suddenly a whole mess of websites that used to be protected with HTTPS are now no longer protected with HTTPS. If there's a graceful and safe way to provide effective advance notice for this, I haven't heard it yet. I agree in spirit; I'd like to see more CA's get the death penalty. But the pragmatic argument against it is convincing.
  - cheald 14y ago
    This seems like a problem that could be pretty easily solved by the browser vendors, similar to how they do malware checks. Throw up a "this site's security certificate was issued by a compromised authority, and will no longer be valid in <x time at y date>. If this is your website, click here for more information." Run that for a sufficiently long period of time, then kill the CA. It's not perfect, but we have a huge web of people using these affected sites on a daily basis who can serve as a very powerful driving force to spur change when necessary to minimize fallout.
  - sc68cal 14y ago
    While I agree with you about pulling the rug out from users - if the CA is already forging certificates for important domains, then how much security do they really have?
    - dustingetz 14y ago
      right now only the turkish government can do MITM - other parties can't.
      - jacquesm 14y ago
        > right now only the turkish government can do MITM - other parties can't. First, if true that's a small comfort. Second, how do you know that is true?
        danielweber 14y ago
        It's in the Turkish government's to use these invalid certs as little as possible, so they are probably going to use them against people like Turkish dissidents. (I don't mean to dismiss their interests, but they are distinct from other people's interests.)
    - tptacek 14y ago
      More than they do if the whole CA is removed. Sorry, annoying but true. Promote TACK!
biturd 14y ago
I don't think you are paranoid. They went from a "mistake" in issuing a "testing" certificate that managed to propagate through their system that just "happened" to be sitting around and configured in a way to be ready to execute a MITM configuration. To me, the chances of that happening seem challenging at best. To have it happen automatically and without hitch or fail, seems highly improbable.

by sc68cal 14y ago

cheald 14y ago

I'd agree. We have plenty of CAs - killing a few off here and there isn't going to harm our ability to manage certificates, and those that make these kinds of mistakes - intentionally or otherwise - aren't worth the trouble of having them around. A couple of CAs being revoked for slipping the wrong certs to the wrong parties is only going to make other CAs triple check their work before handing out the keys to the kingdom.

tptacek 14y ago
No, it won't harm our ability to manage certificates. What it will do instead is create a point in time where suddenly a whole mess of websites that used to be protected with HTTPS are now no longer protected with HTTPS. If there's a graceful and safe way to provide effective advance notice for this, I haven't heard it yet. I agree in spirit; I'd like to see more CA's get the death penalty. But the pragmatic argument against it is convincing.
- cheald 14y ago
  This seems like a problem that could be pretty easily solved by the browser vendors, similar to how they do malware checks. Throw up a "this site's security certificate was issued by a compromised authority, and will no longer be valid in <x time at y date>. If this is your website, click here for more information." Run that for a sufficiently long period of time, then kill the CA. It's not perfect, but we have a huge web of people using these affected sites on a daily basis who can serve as a very powerful driving force to spur change when necessary to minimize fallout.
- sc68cal 14y ago
  While I agree with you about pulling the rug out from users - if the CA is already forging certificates for important domains, then how much security do they really have?
  - dustingetz 14y ago
    right now only the turkish government can do MITM - other parties can't.
    - jacquesm 14y ago
      > right now only the turkish government can do MITM - other parties can't. First, if true that's a small comfort. Second, how do you know that is true?
      - danielweber 14y ago
        It's in the Turkish government's to use these invalid certs as little as possible, so they are probably going to use them against people like Turkish dissidents. (I don't mean to dismiss their interests, but they are distinct from other people's interests.)
  - tptacek 14y ago
    More than they do if the whole CA is removed. Sorry, annoying but true. Promote TACK!

biturd 14y ago

I don't think you are paranoid. They went from a "mistake" in issuing a "testing" certificate that managed to propagate through their system that just "happened" to be sitting around and configured in a way to be ready to execute a MITM configuration. To me, the chances of that happening seem challenging at best. To have it happen automatically and without hitch or fail, seems highly improbable.