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That's potentially legit (people could argue about whether these rails vulnerabilities represent something to worry about in Rails, or whether even mature robus
by jrochkind1 14y ago
That's potentially legit (people could argue about whether these rails vulnerabilities represent something to worry about in Rails, or whether even mature robust projects will still have bugs, including security bugs).
But the fact remains that THIS vulnerability isn't NEARLY as dangerous as some of those OTHER ones you mention in the last 7 months, but those other ones people mostly ignored, and THIS one they're going crazy thinking they need to fix right away.
What I think about the general question? Most (all?) of those Rails SQL injection bugs actually are related to a similar underlying design: Attempt to create methods with 'variable signatures', where you can give it a string OR a hash, or a list of various strings and hashes, and all of those things mean different things.
I think all of the Rails SQL injection bugs are actually related to variable arguments like that. When those variable argument methods were designed in Rails, it's probably safe to say nobody realized there were security implications, that it opens you up to a whole class of bugs where someone puts a hash where you expect a string and it change the semantics of the method call because your variable argument interpreting logic had some flaws. In retrospect, it's possibly not a great thing to do.
But Rails is not the only offender here, it's a pretty common design pattern in lots of ruby -- I think it's probably a mistaken one, but it is one that developers tend to like the convenience of.
- tptacek 14y agoI wish you'd stop telling people how dangerous you're sure this vulnerability is. I think you're probably wrong, but, more importantly, I think the only reason you're saying it is that you're echoing a meme started in an article by someone who isn't really involved in the research behind the vulnerability.
- jrochkind1 14y agoAnd of course, the truth of what you are saying is now evident with the vulnerabilty that 3.2.11 fixes. What I still think this shows is that trying to keep information on the nature of the vulnerability to yourself is not a great idea. People who figured "Well, there's no way for params[:id] to be a hash with a symbol key" (such as myself) were wrong about the severity of the vulnerability. It would have increased everyone's security to admit "Oh yeah, there might be a way to make params[:id] be a hash with symbol key even though you don't think so, yes you should worry about it." Why not do that? Becuase you're worried you're giving someone exploitation hints, probably. But anyone that wanted to exploit had all the hints they need anyway -- as evidenced by the half dozen people credited with reporting the new vulnerability, all of whom got the hint from the 3.2.10 announcement anyway.