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I'm a bit confused why they didn't remove TURKTRUST entirely. It's pretty obvious that they issued to a government under some kind of incentive or coercion, an
by rdl 14y ago
I'm a bit confused why they didn't remove TURKTRUST entirely. It's pretty obvious that they issued to a government under some kind of incentive or coercion, and thus became a MITM threat.
I'm sure every reasonably sized government already has either a root key or an intermediate key, but there should at least be enough penalty when you get caught publicly to deter it -- at least raise the cost of being caught enough that governments won't use their CA powers without fear they might be putting the capability at risk each time.
- cpa 14y agopretty obvious?
- Shank 14y agoI wouldn't call it fairly obvious, but according to this comment -> http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5003707 http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5003707 -> the CAs issued included "*.EGO.GOV.TR," which then created the fake Google certificate. If a government entity got access and then did this, you could establish a link between TurkTrust & the government for creating the CA. That being said, I'd hope that someone researches and figures out why the certificates were issued, to whom, and for what purpose.
- mseebach 14y agoWell, with the help of Google Translate, it appears to be the public transit body of the city of Ankara. If I was an evil government body, I'd ask for my intermediate CA cert to be issued in the name of JohnDoesInconspicuousWidgets.com, not a government organisation.
- rdl 14y agoIt's obvious because they issued and discovered it was being used for google.com certs. If it had been innocuously issued, no one would have attempted to issue google.com certs. Google is in a better position to detect evil google.com certs in use. There's every reason to suspect other evil certs were issued and in use as well (although google.com is probably the most attractive mainstream target; compromising gmail is important to most intelligence and police agencies).
- deleted 14y ago[deleted]
- pasbesoin 14y agoI don't generally like the "strikes and you're out" analogy, but in cases such as this, I find myself favoring a "one strike and you're out" policy. Or zero strikes, if we could force through effective audits. If nothing else, maybe this would put the fear of [entity] into the organizations in question. The erstwhile incompetent ones. The malicious ones, we just need to give the boot, already.
- jrabone 14y agoI'm afraid that was my response. I doubt I'll need them, and I'll re-evaluate if I ever do, but as far as I'm concerned TurkTrust is not a valid CA. Here's how on Windows (you can't delete them, they come back with the next CA update): IE, Chrome & everything else that uses the OS: runas /user:Administrator "mmc certmgr.msc" (might also work as another Admin user if you disabled the real Administrator account) Expand "Trusted Root Certification Authorities" Double-click on TURKTRUST certificate Click "Details" tab and "Edit Properties..." button Click "Disable all purposes for this certificate" Repeat for each TURKTRUST certificate in turn FireFox/Thunderbird & everyone else that reinvented the wheel: Click "Options" -> "Advanced" and choose the "Encryption" tab Click "View Certificates" button Choose "Authorities" tab Click on each TURKTRUST certificate in turn and press "Delete or Distrust"... It's ridiculous that there are well over 300 trusted root CA certificates distributed with Windows 7. Does anyone have a minimal set for the Western world? I don't want to trust Turkey, or Korea, or China, implicitly by default - I'll decide who I trust as and when I have to.
- _firatto 14y agoIsn't Turkey west enough for you ... Or a great west wall should build. ??
- jrabone 14y agoIt's not whether I think Turkey is "West" or "East", it's more than I just don't interact with Turkish websites - so why should I broaden the attack surface of my browser unnecessarily? I realise that the CA -> domain mapping is a poor approximation, but it's the best we've got.
- enraged_camel 14y agoI have a feeling that _firatto is Turkish ("Firat" is a common Turkish name - I know because I'm Turkish!) so he may have taken offense to what you inadvertently implied about Turkey not being part of "The West". :)
- ajross 14y agoObviously they don't blacklist the CA because doing so would break the sites of all of their customers. That's a very high-cost action, and the cost is borne by people not involved in the security situation. You do it only in an emergency. The system has an existing mechanism in place: revoke the cert, (though see the post by mrb above which argues that the revocation was done incorrectly). Longer term, yes: I think looking at punishing TURKTRUST in some way, including revoking their CA, makes sense.
- mseebach 14y agoBut isn't this exactly a high cost situation? Send a loud and clear message that CAs are entrusted with an enormous level of trust, and they damn well better make sure that their procedures are water tight, at the risk of losing their business overnight.
- MichaelGG 14y agoPunishing CAs is a laudable goal, but just immediately revoking a CA will result in worse security. If TURKTRUST is immediately revoked, then all existing sites using it are toast, despite them not being compromised. That just tells users that SSL errors are not to be trusted, that you should just click through. Hopefully, they remove TURKTRUST from signing future certificates. That way existing customers continue to work, but they can't do more damage, and the lesson is taught. Although, I don't think that's built-in to the cert system, it'd be a decent addition.
- mseebach 14y agoThey could give them one month or even three months so their client have time to get their certs replaced, that's not terribly important. But in a broader sense, yes, they were compromised - they had an entity vouch for them that apparently vouched with a blank cheque.
- krickle 14y agoIf the CA issues certs like that they actually are compromised.
- yk 14y agoUsers will not understand that TURKTRUST did something wrong. They just see that Chrome is broken. More abstractly, one of the problems of the CA system is, that no one has any incentive to do the right thing. CAs will try to hide a breach in the chain of trust, since discovering the coverup is no worse for them than discovering the original breach. And blacklisting a CA in a browser will degrade the user experience, so browser vendors are reluctant to do so.