4 ms·
The FSF's attitude towards new technologies seems awfully reactionary (this is somewhat unsurprising when you remember that rms doesn't use a web browser; occas
by geofft 14y ago
The FSF's attitude towards new technologies seems awfully reactionary (this is somewhat unsurprising when you remember that rms doesn't use a web browser; occasionally he emails interesting-sounding URLs to a service that emails them back to him in plain text, and he only checks email once a day).
Secure Boot where you can only run Microsoft-approved software is bad for software freedom, no question about it. Secure Boot as defined by the spec, where there is no requirement to have preloaded MS keys and where users explicitly can load their own keys, is absolutely _good_ for software freedom -- it makes the "evil maid" attack much, much harder. (The "evil maid" attack on full-disk encryption involves someone having access to your computer while it's off, and trojanning the bootloader and having it leak your disk password or the contents of the disk once your system boots. People naively expect full-disk encryption to stop this, but it's as easy as booting from a CD or thumbdrive. With secure boot, it involves physically opening the case and probably replacing chips.)
Let's make sure that Secure Boot stays good for software freedom, instead of throwing out the technology along with the policy, and leaving users with no defense against this sort of attack.
- ajross 14y agoHow many consumer systems have been the victim of evil maid attacks in practice? How many have been infected via browser (or other client) vulnerabilities that never touch the kernel nor interact with a "secure" boot implementation? Secure boot exists primarily because it provides a "feel good" answer to content providers about the feasibility of DRM. It's not an answer to real world security issues and never has been.
- geofft 14y agoSecure Boot does not implement DRM or help in any way for DRM, as it turns out. Secure Boot is about the hardware trusting the OS it's about to boot, not about the OS trusting the hardware it's running on. Once the OS has booted, it has no way to figure out if the "you were secure-booted" flag is trustworthy or not -- a trojan bootloader can easily set that flag and then chainload to the normal OS. If you want the OS to trust the hardware it's on, you need a TPM, and you probably need the machine to be installed by someone who can communicate with the content provider. The entire point of Secure Boot is that it can be implemented just in existing UEFI code, _without_ the additional hardware of a TPM. I develop an OS product that has no browser installed on it at all -- there's one small client application that just interacts with our one server product, and then boots everything else you might want to do in a VM. The biggest threat to the security of our outer layer is, in fact, an evil maid attack. It's certainly worth being aware of that threat, even if there are other, bigger threats. (Nobody says that we should stop worrying about buffer overflows while there are still cross-site scripting attacks, etc.)
- ajross 14y agoI didn't say it "works". What I said was basically: Secure boot answers the question "How do I know someone won't write a crack to steal my content?" in an intelligible way (i.e. "Because it locks down all the software that runs on the device in an uncrackable way.") That's a powerful sales tool. Systems that don't have secure boot have a much harder time selling their DRM implementations. And that's why we have secure boot. Don't fool yourself into thinking all problems are technical.
- temac 14y agoIt is only two or three days since I first heard about the "evil maid" attack. While this could be a preoccupation for some kind of environment, and most probably very few, it is very easy to come with a scheme that both protects against that and allows other operating systems to be installed. Given that this has not been done, and given the small number of people this scenario interests, given that thoses people are unlikely to be interested by Windows 8 to begin with, and even less by Windows RT, Secure Boot has not been designed by MS to prevent that, but really to prevent the installation of other operating systems. The FSF just fight Secure Boot for the real reason it has been created; if you create and alternate security feature for the "evil maid" scenario that preserve user freedom, that would be a completely different subject and you want angry the FSF with it. The FSF's attitude towards new technologies is not reactionary. They fight for user's freedom, as always.
- geofft 14y agoSecure Boot cannot possibly be useful to prevent the installation of other operating systems. Microsoft has a website where they will accept other operating systems to be signed, and there are multiple non-MS operating systems in existence that will boot with no fuss on a machine with Secure Boot enabled. The claim that Secure Boot is bad because MS could decide to stop signing Linux is as ridiculous as the claim that Authenticode is bad because MS could decide to stop signing Firefox, or that HTTPS is bad because MS could replace the set of CAs in Internet Explorer with just itself. The only way to defeat evil-maid attacks is for the early-boot code in your computer's firmware to cryptographically validate the bootloader or kernel that it's about to start, and make sure it's signed by a trusted authority, and make sure that it's possible for the computer owner to disable the ability for anyone other than him to change the set of trusted authorities. This happens to be exactly what Secure Boot does.