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I've been using Fedora since well before they dropped the "Core", but F18 might just be when I jump to Arch. The MSFT signed shim is just too repellent a conce
by jlgreco 14y ago
I've been using Fedora since well before they dropped the "Core", but F18 might just be when I jump to Arch. The MSFT signed shim is just too repellent a concept to me; I will sooner use a distro that makes me mess with UEFI/BIOS options crap.
- yuhong 14y agoI once suggested transferring the keys to a neutral standard body in another thread on HN.
- jlgreco 14y agoIt would be nice to see hardware OEMs completely neutering this nonsense by installing default public keys of their own alongside the MSFT keys, then publicly release the private material so that anyone could sign images that would be trusted by default. Who the hell even needs this "feature"? Are we really so afraid of an "evil maid" attack? People who legitimately need it are a minority (some larger corporations and... paranoid people?) and can remove/add their own keys. I assume some part of their contract with MSFT would prevent them from doing this.
- gurkendoktor 14y ago> Who the hell even needs this "feature"? Are we really so afraid of an "evil maid" attack? People who legitimately need it are a minority (some larger corporations and... paranoid people?) and can remove/add their own keys. Calling people paranoid that want security feature X is not productive. European governments are using Trojans to track pretty small crimes already, and some people regularly change planes in charming environments like China. What you say applies to almost every security measure.
- jlgreco 14y agoListen, I am into security. I've been using FDE for the better part of the past decade, use two-factor authentication along with a passphrase with ssh (and always tunnel my traffic on public wifi), encrypt all of my personal files before I back them up to S3/dropbox/whatever, and have lined my wallet with foil (after microwaving most of my cards). At one point I considered and partially followed through with epoxying the ram into one of my motherboards. For some people, these may be sensible security measures. For most people, including myself, it's just plain old paranoia. So long as it is harmless, there is no problem with it. Protecting the general public from a hypothetical evil maid that wants to swap out their kernel is not harmless if it means inconveniencing consumers^, and is frankly off the deep end. Some people need to worry about that, and the tools needed to protect themselves should be made available to them, but the general public really doesn't have to worry about it. Making people opt-out of it is nuts. ^ Yeah, it's not MSFT's consumers that are being inconvenienced, and I can't imagine OEMs are going to all of a sudden start caring about minority OS users out of nowhere after all of these years... Neither of those facts will make me refrain from futilely complaining on the internet. (as a side note, I don't see how productivity is involved. What does "being productive" mean here?)
- koide 14y agoAs Harry Dresden said: "... just because you're paranoid doesn't mean there isn't an invisible demon about to eat your face."
- gurkendoktor 14y ago> (as a side note, I don't see how productivity is involved. What does "being productive" mean here?) Umm - I guess "convincing" would have been the better word? :) If you blame people for demanding too much security, then it only makes Linux look bad and insecure in comparison to Windows, or at least that was my impression in this thread. I don't think that the threat is inherently less realistic than any of the other things we protect against - the problem is Microsoft's implementation of this particular security measure.
- recoiledsnake 14y ago>Who the hell even needs this "feature"? Are we really so afraid of an "evil maid" attack? People who legitimately need it are a minority (some larger corporations and... paranoid people?) and can remove/add their own keys. Correct me if I am wrong, but the evil maid attack needs a physically present malicious person. The vast majority of bootkits don't need this and can install undetectable malware across the internet.
- jlgreco 14y agoThat may be the case, but if malware is able to swap out your kernel on the filesystem with a malicious one at runtime, surely you are hosed anyway? This seems to like either a protection against a hyper-paranoid threat, or a bandaid on a larger problem. How many security incidents is secure boot actually projected to prevent?
- recoiledsnake 14y agoA signed bootloader that loads a signed kernel(with things like signed filesystem drivers) which loads a signed antivirus executable will actually be able to detect bootkits. A few references to widespread bootkits: http://www.chmag.in/article/sep2011/rootkits-are-back-boot-infection http://www.chmag.in/article/sep2011/rootkits-are-back-boot-i... http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/16/tdl_rootkit_does_64_bit_windows/ http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/11/16/tdl_rootkit_does_64_... http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217953/Rootkit_infection_requires_Windows_reinstall_says_Microsoft http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9217953/Rootkit_infec...
- jlgreco 14y agoIs this antivirus presumably missing the malware that would install the bootkit before it could actually do so? If it gets to the point that secure boot is what saved you, then there was already a series of fairly disturbing errors. Layered security is good, but if it is really needed in a common case to this extent... what the hell is going wrong?
- drivebyacct2 14y agoWhy bother with default keys? Why not just ship with SecureBoot as an optional feature? If people want to really be secure they need to enroll their own key they trust.
- jlgreco 14y agoThat would be better, though shipping with default keys would be more of a "fuck you" to microsoft I think, which appeals to me.
- recoiledsnake 14y agoI wonder who will take on the responsibility on educating people like my mom on who to trust and how to enroll public and private keys. Or how about we have it secure by default and allow people who presumably know what they're doing to turn it off or enroll their own keys or ones they trust because of their heightened knowledge? Are there really a lot of people who are able to partition their hard disk but unable to turn secure boot off? How does that compare with the number of people running Windows and vulnerable to malware and bootkits?
- drivebyacct2 14y ago>Or how about we have it secure by default If the private key is public, it's not secure, there's barely a point, hence my question... That's why I find this all so amusing.
- recoiledsnake 14y agoThe problem is that no neutral standard body is willing to step up.
- rwmj 14y agoThere are lots of valid reasons to dislike Fedora, but "working out of the box on new machines" seems like an unlikely one.
- jlgreco 14y agoNo, but to me "paying microsoft for mythical grandmother users" is reason enough for me.
- TazeTSchnitzel 14y agoEspecially since all x86 machines with Secure Boot allow you to disable it. And to get a LiveCD or Install CD to boot you need to go via the BIOS/UEFI/other firmware anyway.
- rwmj 14y agoA total of $100 was paid to Microsoft. I'm pretty sure that MSFT's not going to break out this massive new revenue stream in the end of year accounts
- jlgreco 14y agoI am well aware. Actually, I thought it was only $90, not $100. It is the principle of the matter. Paying that $90, when really there is little reason to on x86 (it would be more excusable on ARM), is the equivalent of saying "uncle".