>> There will always be an arms race between safe-crackers and safe-builders. > You wouldn't say this about symmetric cryptography. AES-encrypted ciphertexts f

>> There will always be an arms race between safe-crackers and safe-builders. > You wouldn't say this about symmetric cryptography. AES-encrypted ciphertexts from 25 years ago are still secure today, and nothing on the horizon is likely to change that. No arms race. AES encrypted ciphertexts are not a safe. A safe is a physical object. > If the attacker has physical posession of the device, your security is transient and at the mercy of the arms race. That's what we're discussing, yes: a scenario in which physical access to a safe is already acquired. Given that context, don't you think changing the topic to 'non-safes' and 'avoiding physical access' is a little dismissive and glib?