> The argument in brief is this. If you're a materialist Dunno. Suspect I probably am for the purposes here, but not something I think about much. > you proba

> The argument in brief is this. If you're a materialist Dunno. Suspect I probably am for the purposes here, but not something I think about much. > you probably think that rabbits have conscious experience. I definitely think that. > And you ought to think that. OK, well, thanks, I guess. > you probably also think that conscious experience would be present in a wide range of naturally-evolved alien beings behaviorally very similar to us even if they are physiologically very different I definitely do not think that. Obviously, the "alien beings" here are strictly hypothetical, as is "behaviorally very similar to us." Are these things being considered separately and independently of each other? That is, are we allowing for alien beings not at all "behaviorally very similar to us" and considering that only those that happen to be behaviorally similar have conscious experience, while other "alien beings" not behaviorally similar might not? Or are we thinking that any and all alien beings would be behaviorally similar to us? That seems very doubtful. This part of the argument seems very muddy to me and not particularly helpful. > And you ought to think that OK, well, but I don't. Or at least, I don't think I do. It's not that clear to me what it is we're talking about here exactly. For the record, I am neither ascribing nor not ascribing conscious experience to hypothetical beings. Again, I don't think resting part of the argument on this point is very helpful. I'd avoid it if I were you.